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ABSTRACT
The Impact of Realignment on Property Crime: Perspectives of Chiefs of Police
by Daniel S. Llorens
Realignment, instituted in October 2011, was California’s latest effort at prison
reform by realigning responsibility for prisoners labeled nonviolent, non-serious, and non
sex-related from the state to counties. Many of these offenders were in state prison upon
conviction of property crime offenses. Realignment had a net decarcerative effect on
offenders. Simultaneously, California cities’ officer staffing levels shrunk during the
great recession. To determine what impact realignment may have had on property crime
in small California cities, and to identify effective response strategies, property crime and
officer staffing data was analyzed and a survey administered to the chiefs of those cities.
Fifty-six California cities with a population of between 25,000 and 50,000 and
their own police departments were studied. This study analyzed data for the full year
before and after realignment’s implementation, 2010 compared to 2012. Analysis of
these data indicated an overall trend of increase in property crimes reported to the police,
and a significant decrease in officer staffing pre-and post-implementation. Many of the
36 chiefs who responded to the survey identified realignment as the primary factor in the
increase of property crime, closely followed by overcrowding in their local or county jail.
Of the response strategies offered in the survey, most chiefs said they had made progress
on increasing partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies. Finally, a majority of
the chiefs identified increasing partnerships with allied agencies the most effective
strategy followed by the creation or reorienting specialized units to respond to the issue
of realigned offenders.
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION
The Federal Government reported that 1,570,400 persons were imprisoned at the
end of 2012, a staggering number comparable to the population of Philadelphia, PA and
larger than the populations of 12 states, according to the US Census Bureau (DOF, 2014).
Despite a recent trend downward in national prison population, (128,000 fewer
admissions to prison compared to 2009), 18 states and the Federal Bureau of Prisons had
more prisoners incarcerated than their reported capacity (Carson & Golinelli, 2013).
While the US population grew by almost 25 million persons from 2002 to 2012, a 9%
increase, crime reported to the police and the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI)
dropped 14% in the same decade (FBI, 2012). Despite these data, evidence suggests
Americans believed crime is increasing nationally, even as they generally believed crime
in their communities is under control (Dugan, 2013).
In response to spiraling increases in crime beginning in the 1970s, California
lawmakers responded with a get-tough approach and embarked on an ambitious program
of building prisons. Since the 1960s, punitive approaches resulting in longer sentences
have received the get-tough appellation, as differentiated from “soft” approaches more
focused on treatment and rehabilitation (Skoler, 1971). Get-tough initiatives led to rising
rates of incarceration, and California’s prison population rapidly outpaced prison
capacities. Until 1977 California afforded judges significant leeway in sentencing
decisions through indeterminate sentencing (Ducart, 2013). After the law was changed to
a determinate sentencing model, inmate numbers in the state skyrocketed from 20,000 in
1977 to 160,000 in 2011(Ducart, 2013). As the number of inmates became increasingly
unmanageable, California’s overcrowded prison population signaled a system incapable
of providing basic services to inmates (Grattet & Hayes, 2013).
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As a result, men and women sentenced to prison in California petitioned the
courts for relief in response to insufficient medical and psychological care. The seminal
cases on point were brought by two defendants, Ralph Coleman and Marciano Plata, who
successfully argued California’s overcrowded prisons made even minimal medical and
psychological care impossible, thus violating the 8th Amendment to the U.S. Constitution
proscribing cruel and unusual punishment (Coleman, 2009 & Plata, 2007). The courts
joined the two cases as a class action and mandated California move expeditiously to
reduce overcrowding by establishing a population ceiling by certain dates (Plata, 2007).
The courts were silent on just how that lower threshold was to be met.
These court decisions forced California to investigate alternatives to conventional
prison sentencing and housing in order to comply with the court’s order to reduce prison
population. In response to these legal setbacks wherein the state was a defendant, the
California legislature passed, and Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. signed Assembly Bills
109 and 117 into law in April 2011. These laws, generally referred to collectively as AB
109 or realignment, took effect October 1, 2011. AB 109 reassigned responsibility for
the state’s nonviolent, non-serious, and non sex-related offenders to counties in place of
the traditional state correctional model. Persons convicted of non-serious, non-violent, or
non-sexual felonies were realigned to county authorities to serve their time and receive
post-release supervision (AB 109, 2011). Among felonies that previously could have
merited a stint in state prison but were now considered non-serious, non-violent, or nonsexual were those such as narcotics possession, narcotics possession for sale, and
property crimes such as vehicle theft, fraud and burglary (AB 109, 2011).
Proponents argued public safety would improve since offenders would be
supervised and treated at the county level, where they would presumably receive more
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responsive services. Efficiencies would emerge as nonviolent prisoners were realigned
leaving behind only the most violent. In summary, AB 109 was designed to create
efficiencies through reduced recidivism (Petersilia & Lin, 2012).
Realigned offenders currently in California state prisons were transferred to local
jails, to be supervised and treated through county departments of probation and health,
and from late 2011 onward, future convicts would serve their time locally. The rapid
implementation of this law, from April to October of 2011, resulted in county probation
and health departments, among others, not fully prepared for the onslaught of realigned
offenders (Petersilia & Lin, 2012). Once prisoners were realigned from the state to the
counties, overpopulation issues migrated from prisons to county jails. This caused
sheriffs to release realigned offenders and other inmates sooner than anticipated, in what
Rappaport (2013, p.210) called a “shell game”. An example of this is the Los Angeles
County Jail system, where realigned offenders were regularly sentenced to a year in jail
for crimes that would have previously been eligible for state prison, with some inmates
being sentenced to terms between 5 and 40 years (Rappaport, 2013).
Municipal law enforcement agencies were not initially given resources to respond
to realigned offenders. Petersilia, et al, 2013, found AB 109 funds were given to
counties, not cities, and most often allocated to probation departments, sheriff’s
departments, health departments, public defenders or local nonprofits, not local police
departments. According to Jett & Hancock (2013), it is possible a county centric focus
was based on the realization counties would bear the burden of rehabilitation, housing, as
well as establishing evidence-based practices in treating offenders (Vitiello, 2013).
Not wasting time, at least 32 of California’s 58 counties began $2 billion worth of
jail building or expansion across the state (Rappaport, 2013). Data gathered by Stanford
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University’s Criminal Justice Center strongly suggested jail overpopulation was
becoming an emerging problem for California (Lawrence, 2013). The Center
documented an 11% increase in local jail populations in the 12-month period after
realignment’s implementation, and early release of prisoners had increased statewide by
56%. Ironically, but indicative of the unsettling nature of realignment for county
corrections, many of these jails were already under court decree to reduce overcrowding
(Lawrence, 2013). Although realignment was not designed to be an early release
program, a natural displacement of offenders from jail to the community was the net
effect, given the resultant jail overcrowding. Offenders transferred from state prisons to
county jails and offenders now sentenced to county jails caused some sheriffs to
liberalize their release policies for other jail inmates.
Additional research on recent prison reform was needed to determine how
realignment has impacted public safety in California communities, and what strategies
could be employed by local law enforcement agencies to mitigate negative consequences.
Spencer and Petersilia (2013) were the first to inquire how realignment affects
communities, and importantly, crime victims. Additional research may determine what
impact realignment has had on property crime in California communities, and how
realignment has affected municipal police agencies, especially those with modest or
shrinking resources.
Background
National Crime Trends
Inmates became residents of state institutions following a conviction for a felony
offense. These incidents were usually brought to the attention of the police by a victim or
witness, which ultimately resulted in an arrest, conviction, and a term in prison. Tracking
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crime incidents has been the responsibility of the police and has proven valuable in
judging the effectiveness of anti-crime strategies and the level crime in a community,
relative to others.
National crime trends vary greatly from region to region, and care must be taken
when attempting to draw conclusions from data gathered from so diverse a nation. Cities,
for example, tend to have higher crime rates than suburbs, particularly as the discussion
relates to violent crime, and all such populated tend to be more prone to crime than more
rural areas (Jargowsky & Park, 2009). The annual Uniform Crime Report aggregated by
the FBI explicitly warned against “comparing statistical data of individual reporting units
from cities, metropolitan areas, states, or colleges or universities solely on the basis of
their population coverage” (FBI, 2012, National Summary). According to the National
Research Council’s exhaustive 2008 report on crime in the United States, the country
overall saw significant decreases in robberies and murders after the subsidence of the
crack cocaine epidemic of the 1980s. The report identified decreases in property crimes
such as burglary and auto theft, to which the authors attributed a possible increase in
sanctions for those crimes. More recently, the FBI reported that for 2012, violent crime
incidents rose .7% from 2011, but property crime incidents dropped .9 %, which was the
tenth consecutive year property crimes have diminished nationally (FBI, 2012). As for
the rates of crime, or incidents per 100,000 inhabitants in a given year, the rate of crime
has dropped almost 50% in the last twenty years (FBI, 2012).
California Crime Trends
California’s crime rates were also lower than a decade ago. In 2002, the rate of
violent crime in the state was 594 incidents reported per 100,000 inhabitants, or 28%
higher than in 2012 (FBI, 2012). In 2002, the property crime rate was 17% higher than in
5

2012 (FBI, 2012). In 2012, California had a violent crime rate of 423 incidents per
100,000 inhabitants, 3.5% higher than the State of New York and Texas, and a property
crime rate of 2,759 per 100,000, also higher than New York but lower than Texas (FBI,
2012). California’s 2012 rates of violent crime were also much higher in cities than in
rural areas by 11%, and 15% higher property crime rates in cities compared to rural areas
(FBI, 2012).
Three Strikes and You’re Out
Evidence of California’s get-tough response to crime or the perception of crime
was embodied in “three strikes and you’re out,” as habitual offender legislation is
commonly called. The existence of three strikes laws, in place in 25 of the 50 states by
2005, drew significant public attention (Chen, 2008). Identifying a nexus to California’s
issues with overcrowding, Chen (2008) found California’s implementation of three
strikes was stricter than other states and more enthusiastically utilized, resulting in 87,500
offenders being sentenced under the law, including 7,500 who received a life sentences
from 1994-2005. Chen (2008) concluded three strikes laws deterred crime through
incapacitation but also significantly contributed to California’s prison overpopulation
problem.
Prison Overcrowding
Research suggested that over the past few decades California’s policy makers
have struggled with balancing issues of overcrowding, sentencing reform, outpatient
treatment, resource allocation, and public safety concerns. Overcrowding in America’s
correctional institutions had a long history and many proximate causes. Nearly 20 years
ago research demonstrated the futility of a get-tough on crime approach which succeeded
in filling local jails but resulted in unintended consequences, such as increased litigation
6

and facilities made more dangerous for inmates and staff (Kinkade, 1995). Loury (2007)
stated that over-reliance on punitive responses to crime implicate racial disparity in
sentencing and disproportionately reflect one’s rank in the social hierarchy. Other
research confirmed disparate racial impacts from get-tough laws such mandatory
sentencing or anti-gun laws imprisoning higher numbers of poor African-American men
compared to poor white men (Schlesinger, 2008). Recent trends included reform through
sentencing changes, including California’s realignment efforts, and have reduced
American prison population for the last three consecutive years (Cadora, 2014).
California’s Broken System
In 1965, Governor Edmund G. “Pat” Brown signed the Probation Subsidy Act.
Enacted to alleviate overcrowding by favoring treatment and programming over
incarceration, the law reduced prison populations but significant increases in crime led to
public resentment against the law (Rushford, 2012). A backlash against prisoner releases
from 1966 to 1970 led to get-tough reforms and significant spikes in prison populations
between 1986 and 2006 (Grattet & Hayes, 2013; Rushford, 2012). Highly publicized
criminal acts such as the kidnap and murder of 12-year old Polly Klass by career criminal
Richard Allen Davis in 1993 led directly to California’s three strikes law in 1994
(Rushford, 2012). Many writers agreed the passage of California’s three strikes law was
the modern apex of a get-tough posture in the state (Caulkins, 2001; Kieso, 2005; Walsh,
2007) and that the preeminence of crime control over other correctional models followed
suit nationwide (Austin, et al, 1999).
Thus, the stage was set. In California, get-tough on crime responses preceded
overpopulation which predictably resulted in litigation. To highlight the breadth of the
overpopulation issue in the context of three strikes, Pontell and Welsh (1994) found
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instances where orders from judges to reduce population were simply ignored by local
authorities. A series of California governors failed to energize the public and the
legislature to enact significant reforms and head off the conflict between California and
the courts.
Governor Arnold Schwarzenegger came into office with an agenda to address
California’s correctional problems with reforms designed to tackle overpopulation and
the rising costs of traditional sentencing, housing and treatment models. In 2007, after
political pressure from corrections officer unions and others derailed what would have
been a predecessor to realignment in 2005, the prestigious Little Hoover Commission
warned prophetically:
California’s prisons are out of space and running out of time…The Governor and
Legislature must find the political will to move past rhetoric and address ways to
solve the prison population crisis and make good on promises to improve public
safety. “Tough on Crime” sentencing laws have to be judged by outcomes and
matched with fiscal responsibility. To ensure public safety, reforms will have to
jettison posturing to make room for smart on crime policies. (Little Hoover
Commission, 2007, p.1)
Warnings went unheeded, and by the end of 2007 over 170,000 men and women
were held in California state prisons (Schlanger, 2012). Apart from the causes of
California’s overcrowded correctional institutions, the collective voices of litigants would
soon be heard at the highest levels of American jurisprudence.
Coleman and Plata Decisions
Ralph Coleman was an inmate in California’s state prison system that filed suit in
1990 alleging non-existent care for his mental health issues (Coleman, 1995). As
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Coleman painstakingly made its way through the courts, another inmate, Marciano Plata,
sued California for inadequate medical care (Plata, 2007). Eventually, these cases were
joined and presented to a panel of three federal judges, who in 2009 ordered California
prison authorities to reduce the state’s prison population to 137% of capacity (Plata,
2007). One of those federal judges, Thelton Henderson, was blunt in his condemnation,
“[I]t is an uncontested fact that, on average, an inmate in one of California’s prisons
needlessly dies every six to seven days due to constitutional deficiencies in the
[California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation’s] medical delivery system”
(Plata, 2007, p.1372).
The state appealed to a divided United States Supreme Court, which upheld the
three-judge panel’s decision, and ordered California to comply with the panel’s order.
Justice Anthony Kennedy, writing for the 5-4 majority, acknowledged what had become
apparent to a long line of jurists; California’s lack of medical and psychological care for
inmates, resulting primarily from overpopulation, placed the state in direct contravention
to the United States Constitution. In response to the minority opinion, which called the
majority decision reckless, Justice Kennedy, writing for the majority, admitted “The
release of prisoners in large numbers—assuming the State finds no other way to comply
with the order—is a matter of undoubted, grave concern” (Brown vs. Plata, 2011,
p.1921).
Assembly Bill 109
The California legislature’s contemplation of what later became AB 109 actually
predated the Supreme Court’s decision, and was signed into law by Gov. Edmund G.
Brown Jr. in April 2011 (Schlanger, 2012). Offenders previously and from that time
forward convicted of non-serious, nonviolent, and non-sexual-related crimes or “non-
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non-nons” would serve their time in local county jails instead of state prison. Offenders
convicted of such non-non-non offenses would now be supervised by a county probation
department and subject to early release from supervision if they remained free of
subsequent violations. Revocation of probation of probation violations would also be
handled at the local level and offenders would serve local jail time (Schlanger, 2012).
Schlanger concluded that the shift of offenders from state prison to local jails “has the
potential to be decarcerative because it shifts prisoners from low-discretion state custody
to high-discretion county custody” (p.191). The discretion referred to was with respect to
a county sheriff or probation officer. According to the California Department of
Corrections and Rehabilitation, in the year following AB 109 implementation, from
October 2011 to October 2012, California prison population decreased by 23,000, but jail
population only grew by 6,000 persons (CDCR, 2013). This meant a significant number
of offenders were thus out of custody, or displaced. The CDCR also documented the
displacement effect on local jails; by June 2013, 35 counties reported releasing inmates
because of overcrowding, and, “to a modest degree, convicted felons sentenced to jail and
parolees serving time in jail for technical violations were displacing pretrial detainees as
well as sentenced inmates serving time for misdemeanor offenses” (CDCR, 2013, p.4).
The transfer of state’s prison overcrowding issues onto county jails, or what Schlanger
called the “hydra threat” (2012, p. 210), were being raised by other writers regarding the
efficacy and timing of realignment. For example, King (2012) notes realignment did not
sufficiently fund drug treatment, the primary reason many offenders faced incarceration.
In addition, a study concluded in late 2013 by Stanford University’s Criminal Justice
Center sought to draw out the impact of realignment from across the broad spectrum of
the state’s criminal justice practitioners. During the course of this study Petersilia (2013)
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found police and sheriff’s departments were among the most negatively impacted.
Petersilia (2013) quoted one stakeholder who called adjusting to realignment was like
“drinking from a fire hose” and concluded, “our interviews elicited a portrait of counties
struggling, often heroically, to carry out an initiative that was poorly planned and
imposed upon them almost overnight, giving them little time to prepare” (p.7). Other
issues being faced by community corrections professionals include increased health care
costs as older inmates who were being housed for longer periods of time (Vitiello, 2013)
and the overall increase of stress and violence for inmates and staff in local jail facilities
(Lynch, 2013).
Crime Rates and Police Staffing
In a possible correlation with previously mentioned increases in American prison
population in the 1990s, McCarty, Ren, & Zhao (2009) highlighted the 7% increase in
police officers nationwide in the 1990s and how an increase in crime led to increased law
enforcement expenditures. Chief among these expenditures at the national level was the
Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994, which allocated $10 billion
for prison construction and subsidized the hiring of up to 100,000 new police officers
nationwide (USDOJ Fact Sheet, 1994). Whether such significant increases in police
officers across the nation negatively or positively impacted crime is a matter of debate.
Kleck & Barnes (2010) recognized scholarly support for the general deterrence
hypothesis; more officers might deter criminal acts, but this theory was not proved
empirically. They also cast doubt on the incapacitative effect of more officers making
more arrests, which lead to less crime; but provided no data to support this assumption.
Clear & Frost (2014) acknowledge the functional benefit of incapacitation as it relates to
reductions in some crimes, but applauded the end of the “punishment imperative”, or the
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mass incarceration of Americans (p.15). As if to underline the theoretical disparity
further, Ball (2011), in his study of prison sentencing and crime rates noted the vast
differences in how each of California’s 58 counties sentenced persons to state prison.
Ball (2011) pointed out that in the decade before realignment, those counties who sent the
most inmates to prison had the lowest violent crime rates.
As for current trends in law enforcement staffing, Wilson & Heinonen were
among many who acknowledged police personnel challenges were complicated by “an
economic downturn, increasing attrition, a decreasing pool of qualified candidates, fewer
resources, and expanding officer responsibilities” (2011, p.278). Gascon & Foglesong
(2010) also concluded that a steady increase in demands for police services and the
exponentially more complex nature of modern law enforcement complicate the debate as
to whether more police make communities safer. To add to the complexity by
acknowledging the inevitable political dimension, Stucky (2005), argued a city’s political
leaders were attuned to the public’s perceptions of safety, which in turn affect that
agency’s law enforcement response to crime.
Resource reductions made by cities due to the current recession contravenes the
precepts of rational public choice theory, that citizens will appropriately resource law
enforcement to combat real or perceived increases in crime (McCarty, et al, 2009). In
contravention to this theory and due to reduced tax revenues, governmental budgets have
been slashed nationwide, with concomitant reductions in police staffing; about 12,000
officers laid off in 2011 and 30,000 sworn positions simply left unfilled (Wilson &
Weiss, 2012). One recent study which analyzed 24 police agencies, 15 from California,
rendered the following opinion regarding the impact of the recession, “It appears that
when cities or counties reduce the number of sworn police officers as a result of bad
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economic conditions or other factors, the crime rate tends to increase” (Guffey, Larson &
Kelso, 2010, p.39). According to the FBI’s latest Uniform Crime Report that also tracks
police strength nationwide, from 2008 to 2012 California’s sworn officer staffing
dropped 5.2% or about 3,700 officers (2012).
Realignment’s legislative language authorized $4.4 billion to counties through
2016-2017, but Petersilia & Lin (2012) acknowledged this money is funneled through
counties and not directly to cities or municipal law enforcement. AB 109 permitted each
of California’s 58 counties to craft individual realignment spending priorities at the
county level. These spending plans have been diverse; some counties spending as high as
70% or as low as 5% of their funding on local law enforcement (Petersilia & Lin, 2009).
Ducart (2013, p.503) recognized the same issue with realignment’s county-centric
formula, calling attention to, “the non-uniformity that it creates amongst the counties.
Some C[ommunity] C[orrection] P[artnership]s use Realignment's financial incentives by
funding jail development, while others are trying to integrate further community-based
sentencing options.”
Statement of the Research Problem
Lofstrom and Rafael (2013) estimated about 18,000 individuals who would
normally be locked up in state prison have made their way into local communities. Their
investigation also indicated a possible correlation between the implementation of
realignment and a subsequent increase in property crimes among California’s most
populous counties (Lofstrom & Rafael, 2013). California’s first report which sought to
track almost 59,000 offenders as they left the prison system to community corrections did
not reassure; the state found recidivism rates pre- and post-realignment were about equal
(CDCR, 2013).
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Little is known about how smaller municipal entities, bereft of the resources of
their larger sister agencies, withstood the initial impact, if any, of realignment. California
cities with populations of 25,000 to 50,000 and their own municipal police departments
in particular had the potential to be affected. Such police departments expect their
officers to be generalists; the resources for specialized units to track and impede repeat
offenders were likely not available. Such agencies possibly felt the effects of the current
recession, and its accompanying reduction of resources normally allocated for law
enforcement. Further investigation is needed to determine if and to what extent
realignment impacted smaller communities, and whether a reduction of sworn officers, if
it occurred, affected their ability to deal with realignment. During the time period
contemplated by this study, realignment, the recession, police staffing, and jail
overcrowding may have been variables that impacted property crime. Without input
directly from the chiefs, to what extent property crime has been influenced by these
variables would remain unknown. Understanding the speed and effectiveness of response
strategies such as agency collaboration, alternative funding, specialized units, and other
non-traditional partnering would be critical, especially in the context of a groundbreaking
prison reform initiative such as realignment. Since realignment is a novel approach in
California, information on how effectively and how quickly chiefs responded would
remain unknown.
Purpose Statement
The primary purpose of this descriptive correlational study was to identify policy
initiatives that could lead to more effective law enforcement against challenges presented
by prison realignment for small California cities. The second purpose of this study was
to determine the relationship, if any, between sworn officer staffing and property crimes
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reported to the police from 2010 to 2012. The third purpose of the study was to
determine the significance of the impact of realignment, sworn officer staffing, the
recession, and jail overcrowding on property crime as perceived by police chiefs.
Finally, it was the purpose to identify the progress and effectiveness of specific strategies
in response to realignment; increased law enforcement partnerships, seeking alternative
funding, altering staffing models, and engaging non-law enforcement stakeholders as
perceived by police chiefs.
Research Questions
This paper proposes to answer the following questions regarding California cities
with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have their own police departments:
1) To what extent is there a difference in property crimes in 2010 and 2012?
2) To what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer staffing in 2010
and 2012?
3) To what extent is there a correlation between changes in sworn officer staffing
and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012?
4) To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012?
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment
b. The current economic recession
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels
d. County or local jail overcrowding
5) To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the
following strategies responding to realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
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b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
6) How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to
realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
Significance of the Problem
The movement of inmates from the custody of the state to local communities has
the potential to affect public safety. With about 23,000 prisoners realigned since
October 2011 and thousands more displaced from local jails, scholars have only recently
begun exploring outcomes, and much of the focus has been on recidivism, not crime
impact (Schlanger, 2012). Sizable numbers of offenders released from incarceration well
before their sentences were to end may well stress police staffing beyond the point of
being able to protect against property crimes. This may in turn place additional financial
burdens on municipalities as they struggle to provide adequate police services.
Accordingly, the significance of the problem is one of public policy and public safety.
California’s version of realignment, or the reduction of prison eligible crimes and
the transfer to local authorities for responsibility of offender housing, supervision and
treatment, is unprecedented in the country if for no other reason than its scale. This study
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seeks to add to information available to policy makers about the impact on property
crimes of reducing the offenses that merit prison and realigning offenders to local
communities, especially whose police departments were understaffed. Finally, this study
seeks to inform on the effectiveness and tempo of strategies those chiefs may have
contemplated in response to realignment.
Theoretical and Operational Definitions
Board of State and Community Corrections (BSCC). A 13-person board established
by law with some members appointed by the governor and the legislature and are
chartered to make evidence-based, best practice recommendations informing state and
local correctional policy.
California Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). This department
is responsible for the housing, care, and post-release supervision of the state’s convicted
felons. Previously known as the California Department of Corrections (CDC).
County Corrections Partnership (CCP). A working group established previous to, but
later expanded by, AB 109, consisting of a county’s chief probation officer, district
attorney, a chief of police, the public defender, health director, presiding judge, and
county supervisor. It has been empowered by AB 109 to set funding priorities for monies
received from the state.
Decarceration. Strategies, policies, or laws that have the cumulative effect of moving
persons from the custodial environment to those out of custody (Gartner, et al, 2011).
Determinate sentencing. The current law in California for serious crimes: upon
conviction, an offender is sentenced to a fixed term of which a significant percentage
must be served before parole is contemplated, if at all.
Deterrence theory. First developed 250 years ago, this theory holds that criminals
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adjust their behavior depending on the severity, celerity, and certainty of punishment: the
more efficiently and certainly society employs swift punishment appropriate to the crime,
the better to deter that activity (Apel, 2013).
Felony. Specific intent crimes such as murder, rape, arson, vehicle theft or burglary,
whose conviction is punishable by death, or imprisonment in the county jail or state
prison.
Incapacitation theory. Crime is prevented when offenders are incarcerated because
their inability to victimize others is assured; determining how much crime is prevented is
the subject of some debate (Zimring & Hawkins, 1995).
Indeterminate sentencing. In California, until 1977, most offenders convicted of
criminal acts were given sentences with broad ranges, allowing for an inmate to meet the
low range and subsequently seek parole assuming good behavior.
Misdemeanor. Crimes such as drunk driving, theft of less than $900, or prostitution
whose conviction is punishable by a fine or imprisonment in the county jail for not more
than one year or both.
Non-non-non. As outlined by AB 109, convicted felons eligible for realignment with a
most recent conviction for a non-violent, non-sexual, non-serious crime.
Parole. State level supervised release. A defined period of time, usually three years,
after the service in the state prison. The state can stipulate terms of behavior, reduced
constitutional protections against government searches and seizures, and subject to
sanctions by the parole board upon an evidence-based hearing.
Post release community supervision (PRCS). Under realignment, county probation
departments take over supervision of inmates considered “non-non-nons”, and supervise
their adherence to probation terms, treatment, and service delivery. This was previously
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the job of state Department of Correction parole officers.
Probation. County level supervised release. Formal probation is of a defined duration,
can stipulate terms of behavior, usually includes reduced constitutional protections
against government searches and seizures, and is subject to revocation by the court or by
a probation officer upon showing of cause.
Property Crime. A crime event reported to the police wherein the victim suffers some
loss of monetary value such as vehicle theft, burglary, embezzlement, or fraud.
Rational public choice theory. Resource allocations made by public policy makers is
akin to the relationship of supply and demand; the citizenry will resource public safety
appropriately when faced with the need for protection against crime (McCarty, et al,
2009).
Realignment (AB 109, or Public Safety Realignment). California’s most recent
attempt to reform state and community corrections by realigning non-violent state
prisoners to county jails and re-classifying certain felonies as ineligible for state prison.
Signed into law by Governor Edmund G. Brown Jr. along with companion bill AB 117
and effective October 1, 2011, later amended by AB 118, AB 116, and AB 17, regarding
technical changes and funding structure (Fazzi, 2013).
Split Sentencing. A sentencing formulation introduced by realignment dividing custody
time between terms in the county jail followed supervision by the county for low level
offenses. This process allows judges to give inmate an early opportunity to interact with
probation and access post-release services (Pennypacker & Thompson, 2013).
Sworn Police Officer. A police department employee certified by the California
Commission on Police Officer Standards and Training as having met the requirements of
a police officer though a combination of experience and training, and sworn by a duly
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constituted authority to make arrests per Penal Code §832. Sworn officers are
distinguished from professional staff such as dispatchers, cadets, or police service
officers. Others, such as California Highway Patrol officers and county sheriff’s deputies
are sworn officers per Penal Code § 832, but are not the focus of this study.
Three strikes law. Modern iteration of habitual offender laws designed to punish
persons convicted of three or more felony convictions. California’s 1994 version
required persons convicted of a two serious felonies or “strikes” to serve at least 80% of
their sentence before eligibility for parole, and persons convicted of a third serious felony
to serve a term of not less than 25 years to life.
Uniform Crime Report (UCR). Annual report issued by the Federal Bureau of
Investigation containing aggregated data of among other thing, crimes reported to the
nation’s law enforcement agencies.
Violent Crime. Crime event reported to the police resulting in the murder, rape, or
significant bodily injury perpetrated on a victim; sometimes referred to as crimes against
persons.
Delimitations
Delimiting factors or variables are those that narrow the way in which findings
can be generalized (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010). The present study is delimited by
the unique nature and scope of realignment, therefore, this study is delimited to police
departments in California cities with populations between 25,000 to 50,000. Findings
cannot be generalized outside California because no other state or territory has
contemplated such a significant realignment from state to community corrections. The
population and sample also delimits further extrapolation because only cities with
populations between 25,000 to 50,000 were being studied. Smaller or larger cities would
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have different economic and demographic makeups significantly limiting the value of
any findings. The cities in the population and sample were served by their own police
departments, not the county sheriff, usually the largest law enforcement in a county, thus
delimiting findings that highlight limited resources. This study seeks insight as to the
impact of crimes against property, not violent crimes, which were categorized differently,
have much longer jail or prison terms attached, and often arise from something other than
a personal gain motive. Finally, this study seeks information from police chiefs
representing their police departments. Executives of agencies within a county such as
chief probation officers, sheriffs, prosecutors or public defenders would have different
responsibilities and insights.
Organization of the Study
The remainder of the study is organized into four chapters, a bibliography, and
appendixes. Chapter II presents the historical overview of crime in the United States and
California, reporting methods, trends towards get tough policies, the resultant
overcrowding in California prisons, the implementation of realignment and its impact on
state and local authorities and jurisdictions. Chapter III explains the research design and
methodology of the study. This chapter includes an explanation of the population,
sample and data gathering procedures as well as the procedures used to analyze the
collected data. Chapter IV presents, analyzes and provides a discussion of the findings of
the study. Chapter V contains the summary, findings, conclusions, recommendations for
actions and further research.
Thus, we see that national and state get-tough legislation drove increasing levels
of incarceration resulting in overcrowding, leading to demands for reforms. Since at least
2008, the recession has negatively impacted municipalities resulting in reduced law
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enforcement staffing. Overcrowding in California led to a series of court decisions
mandating the state immediately reduce its prison population. In response, AB 109 and
AB 117 were passed in 2011, resulting in reduced prison population and transferal of the
corrective and supervisory burden for these inmates to county and local authorities. This
process, known as realignment, has had an overall decarcerative effect at the local level.
By transferring overcrowding issues from the state prisons to county jails, local
authorities sought to strike a balance between public safety and the prospect of
overcrowded jails. How effectively this balance has been struck, in conjunction with
efforts by local police departments facing personnel cuts, required further inquiry and
analysis. The following chapter expored in greater depth the existing literature regarding
the provenance and root causes for national and state prison overcrowding. Drivers of a
get-tough approach to criminal behavior through sentencing were explored along with the
consequences of this approach. The chapter reviewed findings from writers regarding the
scope and effect of overcrowding in California prisons and the path that eventually led to
court-ordered reform. A review of the nation’s efforts to quantify and classify crime was
included since it foundational to the analysis of crime in the United States, including
issues with underreporting of crime by certain populations. The chapter explored the
effect of the recession on local municipalities, and the overall reduction in police staffing.
The scholarly debate on to what degree police staffing levels help deter crime was
presented as well as the parallel debate on the value of incapacitation of criminals
through imprisonment. The path that led to realignment via the courts was outlined, as
well as the reform that it spawned, namely, realignment. How realignment has been
implemented, including the allotment of resources and current data of the impact to local
stakeholder was included.
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CHAPTER II: REVIEW OF THE LITERATURE
According to California’s Little Hoover Commission, at the height of its
overcapacity, the state housed 173,000 inmates in 33 prisons designed to accommodate
half that amount (Little Hoover Commission, 2007). AB 109 came about as a result of
overcrowding in California’s state prisons and the resultant substandard healthcare
provided to the state’s inmates. AB 109 reclassified certain felonies so persons thus
convicted would serve time in community correctional facilities as opposed to state
prisons, and be supervised and treated locally rather than by state authorities.
The goal of AB 109 was to strike a new path in corrections reform that would
simultaneously reduce California’s prison population to constitutional levels, reduce state
costs by shifting the burden of supervision of thousands of inmates to the state’s 58
counties, and reduce recidivism through improved programmatic efficiencies created by
local control. Simultaneously, many California municipalities were feeling the impact of
the great recession, with the net effect of the stagnation or loss of sworn police officer
positions.
The following is a review of the literature on issues foundational to the purpose of
the study, such as national and state get-tough approaches to crime that led in part to
overcrowding and AB 109. This chapter will also review the literature on the impact of
the current recession on cities, police staffing relational to crime control efforts, policing
strategies, and the impact of prison reform on stakeholders.
Review of the Literature
Get-tough Approach
Popular and political pressure. The “knee jerk” reaction to heinous crimes by
policy makers has often led to get-tough approaches and more stringent penalties to a
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wider variety of criminal acts (D’Elia, 2010). In California, the murder by Richard Alan
Harris of Polly Klaas elevated the demand for get-tough approaches such as three strikes
into the highest level of California politics (Zimring, et al, 2001). Cullen, Fisher &
Applegate (2000) found that public perception of crime and punishment tended to be
more repressive and less rational when the intricacies of the justice system were least
understood. Chambliss (2001, p.9) spoke for many reform-minded writers, “There is, in
short, a huge chasm between the reality of crime, the public’s perception of it, and the
information being disseminated to the public by law enforcement agencies, the media,
and politicians.” Zimring (et al, 2001, p.155) agreed, although they acknowledge the
“nasty mood’ in the nation regarding control of crime was properly attributable to
frustrations about skyrocketing crime rates. Get-tough approaches invariably led to
higher incarceration rates, leading some to question the fairness of higher rates of
incarceration, and incarceration itself as a crime prevention tool (Nagin, 2013).
Three strikes and you’re out. By the beginning of the 20th century, some states
like Georgia already had laws designed to punish habitual offenders (Schultz, 2000). In
the early 20th century California and others passed similar laws that survived
constitutional challenges, but by 1980 only three states still had habitual offender laws on
the books (Schultz, 2000). Early in the 1990s there was a significant movement
nationally toward a crime control approach, and California was no different. California’s
was in part driven by the public’s perceptions for the need to address crime and career
criminals (Zimring, et al, 2001). Public perceptions about crime and highly publicized
criminal acts in California by repeat offenders led to the modern iteration of the habitual
offender law popularly called ‘three strikes and you’re out” (Ardaiz, 2000). At the
national level, Schultz (2000) found three strikes laws helped add to prison
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overcrowding, disproportionately impacted minorities, and failed to have a substantive
impact on violent crime. In contrast, a study of Florida’s habitual offender law’s impact
on crime rate did establish a relationship with harsher sentences and slight decreases in
rape, robbery, larceny and vehicle theft (Kovandzic, 2001). Examining the law’s impact
in California just a few years after implementation, Shinbein (1996) and Vitello (1997)
criticized inefficiencies and disparities brought about by three strikes, including its failure
as a crime control measure. Contrasted against Shinbein and Vitello were the findings of
Ardaiz (2000), who examined a larger period of time and additional crime data and
concluded three strikes could be credited with averting thousands of violent crimes
through incapacitation of habitual criminals. Ardaiz (2000) held that incarcerated
offenders were incapable of victimizing people outside the walls of their institution.
Finally, as if to strike a balance with two extremes, was a comprehensive 10 year review
of California counties most and least likely to send three strikers to prison found only
modest crime rate reductions for the stricter counties (Brown & Jolivette, 2005).
More recent studies cast doubt on the law’s ability to keep communities safe, and
address issues of disparate treatment and proportional punishment (Heyer, 2012). This
criticism was based on the law’s focus on the offense and not the offender, a shortcoming
Heyer (2012) decries as ironic since three strikes was billed a way to punish offenders
otherwise immune from correctional efforts.
Three strikes and overcrowding. As pertaining to overcrowding, many writers
identify three strikes as a contributor to California’s prison overpopulation problem
(Chen, 2008; Schultz, 2000; Heyer, 2012). In addition, Walsh (2007) articulated an
unintended consequence of the three strikes law that impacted local stakeholders: the
displacement effect in local jails when three strikes candidates remained incarcerated
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while misdemeanants were released in greater numbers.
In terms of legal challenges to three strikes, the Supreme Court’s decision in
Ewing noted that a majority of felons released from prison recidivate within three years
even as they upheld three strike’s constitutionality (Ewing, 2003). Since 1994, California
voters have amended three strikes, eliminating, among others, simple drug possession as
a catalyst for a life term and re-defining serious felonies that qualify under the act
(Walsh, 2007).
Other get-tough sentencing laws. Few judicial actions have had such long-term
effects on the make up the nature of this generation’s correctional population than
mandatory and determinate prison sentencing (D’Elia, 2010). The philosophy of
mandatory prison sentences, or the attaching of specific and often lengthy sentences to
specific offenses, grew in popularity at the federal and state level as judicial stakeholders
ramped up their efforts on the war against drugs (Subramanian & Delaney 2014). In
California, the transition away from indeterminate sentencing eclipsed 60 years of
previous juris prudence (Fazzi, 2013). Despite concerns over the efficacy and fairness of
mandatory sentences (Tonry, 2009), the adoption of mandatory sentencing for federal
drug convictions in 1986 and the aforementioned three strikes law in California was not
substantially reformed until this decade. The United States Sentencing Commission was
critical of mandatory sentencing’s impact on prison populations, and Congress made
significant structural changes regarding mandatory sentences to the country’s drug laws
in 2010 (Subramanian & Delaney 2014).
1994 also saw California undertake an amendment to the Welfare and Institutions
Code to allow prosecutors authority try juveniles as adults, thereby facilitating their
transfer from juvenile authorities to the state prison (WIC 707, 1994). In 2000,
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California voters overwhelmingly passed Proposition 21, which increased sentences for
juvenile offenders and adults related to gang crimes and other serious felonies (Taylor,
2002). These and other get-tough approaches were often the result of a popular wave of
concern over public safety.
Policy makers drove California’s sentencing laws and guidelines towards a crime
control posture in other ways. Governor Ronald Reagan signed California’s first version
of a “use a gun, go to prison law” in 1969, a sentencing enhancing law later modified and
given a new moniker, “use a gun and you’re done” (PC §12022.53, 2014). The current
law mandates a term of 10-20 years for the use of a firearm during the commission of
certain felonies such a murder, rape, and robbery. During Governor Edmund G. Brown
Jr’s first term he signed California’s first determinate sentencing law, declaring that
California’s penal system was in place to punish offenders (Dansky, 2008). The law
established specific sentence structures for state courts, leaving indeterminate sentencing
only for crimes such as murder (Dansky, 2008). Under the progressive political
landscape of the time this law should kept sentences on the lower end of the spectrum.
As Sacramento’s political outlook changed, however, legislators passed laws lengthening
sentences, in many cases reducing the discretion of state judges (Dansky, 2008). Finally,
in 1988 California voters approved Proposition 80, an 817 million dollar bond designed
to build prisons, jails, and youth detention facilities (Gilmore, 2007).
With the necessary legal and grey bar infrastructure in place, California was
poised to lead the nation in placing its denizens in prison at rates previously unknown
within the borders of the United States (Males, et al, 2006).
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Racial and Economic Disparities
The fact that American prisons were racially skewed against people of color and the
disadvantaged is a matter of record, but determining why was more complex. Pettit &
Western, 2004, determined a male African-American high school dropout born in the late
60’s had a 60% chance of being imprisoned, possibly related to declining urban wages,
the culture of jail inevitability, and the crack epidemic. Sutton (2013) examined 12 of
California’s most populous counties and found that African-Americans faced much
longer prison sentences as compared to similarly situated white persons. Examining the
impact of harsh sentence structures, Schlesinger (2011) hypothesized that a
disproportionate number of crimes committed by people of color had mandatory sentence
attachments, constituting a kind of colorblind racism.
As a way to highlight the disparity of such sentencing philosophies on urbanized
people of color, Schlesinger noted nearly 5% of all African-American men were
incarcerated either in prison or jail (2011). In California, Noll (2012) added dimension to
the complexity of the issue by dissecting the impact of the CDCR’s policy of segregating
prisoners along racial lines. While the Supreme Court ruled the practice of separating the
races in prison constitutionally valid if narrowly defined, Noll argued the necessity for
racial segregation spoke to racial imbalances that permeate the nation’s largest
correctional system (2012).
Crime Reported in the United States
Crime Reporting and Statistics
The Uniform Crime Report. Criminal acts normally come to the attention of the
police when victims or witnesses contact them. Once information is gathered and police
take a crime report, it is classified in one of several categories. The close of the calendar
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year signals to the thousands of law enforcement agencies in the country to forward data
on reported crimes to the FBI for aggregation and analysis (Nolan, et al, 2011; FBI,
2012). This expansive accumulation of data is later disseminated publically as the
Uniform Crime Report (UCR). Collected since the 1920’s, UCR data is considered
generally reliable, although concerns have been raised regarding errors in classification
based on human error, especially regarding property crimes (Nolan, et al, 2011; FBI,
2012). Recognizing the varied and volatile nature of crime and crime reporting, federal
authorities warn against using national crime data to rank the effectiveness of disparate
police agencies or crime control strategies (FBI, 2012).
The National Crime Victimization Survey. The other well-established method
to measure crime nationally has been the National Crime Victimization Survey (NCVS),
an instrument administered by the Census Bureau asking participants to report if they
have recently been victims of crime (Lauritsen, et al, 2014). Previous research has
indicated a wide disparity in reports of victimization, as captured by the NCVS (O Brien,
1996), and those reported to the police as captured in the UCR, although that gap appears
to be narrowing (Catalano, 2006). Cantor and Lynch (2000) were satisfied the national
survey and UCR data tend to complement each other’s findings and discrepancies were
less problematic. More of concern to researchers is bias in reporting, wherein serious
crimes were much more likely to be reported than less serious crimes, leading to these
lesser crimes being understated in reports such as the UCR (Levitt, 1998). Most
researchers will account for this bias when they examine reported crime data.
Crime reporting validity. Questions may properly be raised about the accuracy
and validity of data about which so many policy decisions were made and scholarly
inferences drawn. The quality and quantity of the public’s relationship with their local

29

law enforcement agency was a significant variable in how often victims report crime to
the police (Levitt, 1998). Avdija and Giever were among several researchers who found
correlations between gender, socio-economic status, and race and reporting crime to the
police (2012). Property crime in particular was more likely to be reported when the
socio-economic level of the victim was higher (Avdija & Giever, 2012). Goudriaan
(2006) argued in addition to socio-economic reasons, perceptions of police effectiveness
and the nature of the victim’s neighborhood influence the frequency of reporting of crime
to the police. In contrast, Davis and Henderson (2003) found racial, ethnic, and socioeconomic factors were not as impactful as how connected and empowered victims within
their communities.
Social status, crime and crime reporting. Merton’s (1938) foundational
exploration on the causes of crime in the United States posited that such activity could be
traced in part to an inexorable desire among Americans to improve their economic lot in
life. Merton (1938) also identified pressure upon those less affluent as they struggled to
make economic headway; especially if society burdened them in ways the affluent were
not. Chambliss (2001) found a correlation between the lack of wealth and incarceration
levels as well as disparities related to race and gender; the poor and persons of color were
more likely to end up in prison.
In the wake of the great recession that began seven years ago, it is illuminating to
examine literature that accounts for the economic variables as they relate to crime since
2007. Writers on this subject have been challenged by the counter-intuitive nature of this
great recession (Rosenfeld, 2013). While researchers have often looked to bellwether
indicators such as high unemployment or foreclosure rates that tended to auger in crime
increases, Rosenfeld (2103) found crimes such as robbery or burglary fell significantly
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during the current recession. Rosenfeld did find a relationship between wage levels and
violence, especially among those 18-24 in age; persons in that age group whose wage
levels were low, tended to be more likely to commit crimes of violence. Wolff, et al,
(2014) found no relationship between the substantial foreclosure rates that marked the
current recession and crime rates. Lauritsen, et al (2014), agreed little evidence for
linkage between economic hardships resulting from the recent recession and significant
increases in reported crime existed.
Crime classifications. The US Department of Justice defines eight crimes to be
of greatest concern to policy makers, communities and researchers as Part 1 crimes;
murder, rape, robbery, aggravated assault, burglary, larceny, motor vehicle theft and
arson (BJS, 2009). According to Douglas, et al, 2013, crimes may be characterized by
their likely outcome such as murder, rape, and robbery; or the monetary, non-violent
intent of the offender such as theft, fraud, and burglary. The former group was popularly
known as property crimes.
As the present study seeks insight on realignment’s possible impact on property
crimes, Becker’s (1968) historical yet impactful proposition that criminals often weigh
the chances of punishment against the potential for financial gain is still relevant. Davis’
(2006) economic model of crime expanded on the variables of loot and arrest probability
by adding the importance of the agent’s crime environment: the more attractive the
neighborhood to operate the more likely the theft. Thus the focus on property crime in
this study as thousands of inmates convicted of property crimes offenses were realigned
to community corrections.
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Traditional Corrections
Incapacitation
Before realignment, California’s pervasive correctional philosophy was
incapacitation (Bhati, 2007; Duker & Malsch, 2012). The theory of incapacitation holds
that appropriately sentenced offenders cannot commit crimes within the public sphere
while they were locked up in prison or jail, thereby positively impacting public safety
(Zimring & Hawkins, 1995; Males, et al, 2006). While the effectiveness or even
constitutionality of incapacitative policies has been questioned, it is clear the state’s focus
on arrests and convictions resulted in more arrests and convictions (Bhati, 2007). Wilson
(2007), commented on the shortsightedness of incapacitation compared to rehabilitation,
branded incapacitation incapable of “changing anything about people except where they
are” (p.14). Also, Rose and Clear (1998) pointed to the seemingly endless cycle of
incarceration in some communities as destabilizing to families and social order groups
which likely increased criminal behavior, not reduced it. Finally, Johnson and Rafael
(2012) found a 30% drop in the crime reduction capabilities of incarceration in the period
between 1978-1990 compared to 1991-2004, showing a reduction in incapacitation’s
effectiveness.
California has been particularly effective in locking people up as compared to the
other 49 states. While the country’s incarceration rate increased 250% from 1980 to
2010, California incarceration rate increased 365% for the same period (Sourcebook,
2010). As further evidence of this, Table 1 contains the abbreviated findings of Males,
Macallair, and Corcoran (2006), outlining arrests and imprisonment rates for youth and
adults in California since 1970, in five-year increments. Table 1 contains clear evidence
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crime control policies in the last three decades in California have resulted in more
persons arrested and imprisoned.
Table 1
California Youth and Adult Rates of Arrest for Violent Crime and Imprisonment Rates,
per 100,000 Population by Age, in Five-Year Increments
____________________________________________________________________
Youth (ages 10-17)
Adult (ages 18-69)
Year Violent crime Imprisonment
Violent crime
Imprisonment
arrest rate
rate
arrest rate
rate
____________________________________________________________________
1970
310.6
194.5
324.4
161.1
1975
551.0
142.9
396.5
116.1
1980
555.6
169.9
435.8
137.3
1985
394.8
213.7
379.9
275.9
1990
641.9
251.6
651.6
473.8
1995
596.2
263.5
645.1
642.6
2000
408.6
179.7
513.3
713.4
2005
71.2
674.6
____________________________________________________________________
It appeared get-tough sentencing laws, as well as prison building, were
dependable precursors to higher incarceration rates. Judging efficacy of get-tough
measures is harder to articulate, since many states enjoyed historic reductions in crime
from 1993-2004, as shown in Table 2, adapted from Walsh’s comprehensive Three
Strikes Laws (2007). Walsh’s (2007) illustration depicts significant drops in violent and
property crime during three strikes’ years of influence, but New York enjoyed the highest
percentage drop in crime without the benefit of a California version of three strikes.
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Table 2
Crime rates of most populous states. The rates are expressed as number of crimes per
100,000 people. The government excludes the murder and non-negligent homicides that
occurred as a result of the events of September 11, 2001.
______________________________________________________________________
California
Florida
New York
Texas
______________________________________________________________________
Violent Property Violent Property Violent Property
Violent Property
1993 1,078
5,379
1,206
7,415
1,074 4,478
762
5,677
2004
552
3,419
711
4,180
442 2,199
541
4,494
Percent
Reduction

49

36

41

44

59

51

29

21

________________________________________________________________________

Liedka, et al, (2006) rhetorically summarized the contrasting theories on the
efficacy of incapacitation this way; does the massive increase of incapacitation through
incarceration that began in the late 1980s covary with the drop in crime in the decades
that followed? Bhati (2007) examined offender tracking data from California to estimate
each offender locked up in his mid-twenties prevented 24 crimes if imprisoned over a
decade. In contrast, Chambliss (2001), Zimring and Hawkins (1995) were among those
who discounted the value of incapacitation, while Marvell and Moody (1996), Levitt
(2004), were just as adamant in identifying a clear correlation between incapacitation and
public safety. Liedka, et al, (2006) argued their findings demonstrate the benefit of a
synthesis of opposing literature on this issue. They conceded the nation’s prison building
and prison filling proclivity had the desired effect of reducing crime, but were also
convinced the saturation point of “declining marginal returns” has been reached (Liedka,
et al, 2006, p.272). Lofstrom and Rafael (2013) concurred diminishing returns reduce the
preventative benefit of incapacitation, but convincingly set the stage for monetarily
quantifying the removal of criminals from society through incarceration. Using previous
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extrapolations as well as their own findings, they estimated each realigned inmate in
custody prevents 2.1 property crimes per year, on average (Lofstrom & Rafael, 2013).
Acknowledging the public policy implications of arguing a cost benefit analysis of
correctional strategies is attainable; Lofstrom and Rafael (2013) questioned what
threshold of crime stakeholders were willing to tolerate.
California Prison and Jail Overcrowding
Many studies have tracked the steady increase in prison overcrowding as it
mirrored crime control rhetoric and policies of the 70’s and 80’s. Schlanger (2013)
pointed to a get-tough philosophy following increased crime rates of the 1970’s as a
proximate cause to state prison overcrowding. At the end of the current millennium,
California had a more populous prison system than the populations in Germany, England,
France or the United Kingdom (Zimring, el al, 2001). Salins and Simpson (2013) also
pointed to California’s parole system, unique in the United States, in which inmates were
regularly sent back to prison for technical violations, that in 2007 accounted for over half
of inmates entering prison. Like other prison systems, California had additional concerns
caring for a rapidly aging population that complicated and added expense to prison
operations (Simon, 2013). Noll (2012) accounted for the substantial challenges in
housing a population constantly in the midst of racially fueled gang warfare, forcing
correctional staff to devise new ways to classify inmates so enemies were kept at
distance, including racial segregation.
California state prisons have instituted maximum-security facilities within the
prisons to house inmates deemed to be a danger to other inmates and staff.
Overcrowding in the state’s correctional facilities exacerbated the scale and nature of
violence in prison. Apart from a lack of adequate medical and mental health care, the
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sheer number of inmates placed an inordinate amount of stress on corrections officers, as
evidenced by inmate on inmate assaults and assaults on staff (Rappaport & Dansky,
2010). Haney (2003) established that inmates housed in these secure but isolated
facilities developed a wide array of psychological dysfunctions, adding to the stress of
inmates and for staff. Awareness of overcrowding as a precursor to dangerous conditions
for staff was present as early as 2006 (Specter, 2010). The Little Hoover Commission
(2007) reported that between 2003 and 2006, 1,700 claims were filed by CDCR staff
following assaults by inmates.
As California’s prison population levels were engendering an emergency
proclamation from Governor Schwarzenegger, he acknowledged in late 2006 that prison
overcrowding was causing overcrowding in county jails (Schwarzenegger, 2006). The
Governor’s proclamation noted over 200,000 prisoners avoided incarceration or were let
out early, and 20 of 58 county jails were already laboring under court-mandated
population caps (Schwarzenegger, 2006). Previous to realignment, judges were also
required to send some inmates to state facilities because of sentencing requirements, but
also because of the dearth of community correction and treatment alternatives (Little
Hoover Commission, 2007).
Impact of local sentencing. Ball (2012) argued that counties have only recently
begun to bear the weight of their own sentencing decisions. Since counties empanel the
juries, elect the judges and prosecutors, and appoint probation and police chiefs, they had
the freedom to get-tough at the state’s expense regardless of the impact on the state as a
whole (Ball, 2012). In arguing for a data-driven approach to violent crime sentencing,
Ball believed a distinction between “crime-justified incarceration and policy-driven
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incarceration” was required to assure effective use of resources while maintaining public
safety (Ball, 2012, p.1001).
The following figure shows California state prison populations from 2003-2013 as
gathered by the Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation (CDCR). The figure
illustrates the height of population at 173, 312 in 2007 to its decade low of 135, 238. The
CDCR also projects modest increases for 2014 and 2015 to 137,935.
Figure 1. California Total Prison Population 2004-2013
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Figure 1. The total prison population within state facilities as captured by the California
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation. Numbers are for 2003-2013. Adapted
from “Institutional Population Trends, Actual and Projected” retrieved from
http://www.cdcr.ca.gov/Adult_Research_Branch/Research_Documents/Spring-2014Population-Projections-Publication_06092014.pdf
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Near the height of overpopulation, drug and property crime offenses accounted for
37% of offenders housed in prison, or over 62,000 inmates (Little Hoover Commission,
2007). This dynamic would later become a key focus of realignment’s tenet that nonviolent, non-serious offender serve their time in community corrections.
Impact on county jails. In California, each of the 58 counties has an elected
sheriff, the official in the county responsible for maintaining a county jail. As county
sheriffs faced an increase in inmates in their jails, many responded by affording early
releases to their charges. Hill, et al, (2013) examined the trends in most California jail
bookings for the BSCC and their findings reveal the impact of realigning the care of
inmates from state to county facilities. In the nearly two years since implementation, the
average daily population of jails in the study increased from 72,285 in October 2011 to
82,705 in September of 2013 (Hill, et al, 2013). Since realignment was designed to
transfer the care of inmates sentenced for low level felonies as well as the advent of split
sentencing, this was expected. A majority of this difference not surprisingly, were
sentenced inmates; by a ratio of nearly six to one (Hill, et al, 2013). Their data also
indicated misdemeanants were being released early, supported by findings showing a
15% and 68% increase in non-sentenced and sentenced inmate early releases due to lack
of housing capacity (Hill, et al, 2013). Fortunately, Hill, et al, (2013) found that assaults
on jail staff saw significant decreased in assaults since realignment’s implementation.
As this study transitions from corrections to policing, it is instructive to note
Nagin’s (2013) summary of the interplay of some of these critical criminal justices
forces. Alluding to the role of effective policing, Nagin believed the certainty of being
caught was more a deterrent than the punishment itself (2013). Also implicating the
effectiveness of policing strategies was Nagin’s argument that law enforcement deters
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crime by convincing criminals they will likely be caught, an idea that sets the stage for an
examination of the literature on police resourcing and tactics.
Forces Influencing Police Staffing
Impact of the Great Recession on California Municipalities
The national recession which began in 2007 has ushered in what Kiewiet and
McCubbins called the “New Fiscal Ice Age,” where “a given level of state and local tax
revenue purchases a considerably lower level of current services” (2014, p.106).
Leachman, et al, also reported on the trend by the federal government to slough off
funding for social programs that now had to borne by states and local authorities (2011).
The recession has contributed to the loss of local tax revenue, directly impacting the
money municipalities use to pay for services, at the same time money from their state
capitols and Washington has been significantly reduced (Pew, 2012). This same study
found California state and local governments reduced over 100,000 public sector
positions since 2007. Indeed, California has been labeled the “fountainhead” of the
recession, with its immense nationwide influence and over 1 million jobs lost between
2007 and 2009 (Bardham & Walker, 2011).
Many California cities, struggling to recover from the recession, were dealt an
equally debilitating blow with the dissolution of the Redevelopment Agency (RDA) by
Governor Brown in 2012 (Davidson & Ward, 2014). California cities were forced to pay
billions back to the state, laying off thousands of employees previously compensated at
least in part through RDA proceeds (Davidson & Ward, 2014).
Another area impacting city budgets was employee benefits. Most California
cities with municipal police departments partnered with the California Public Employee
Retirement System (CALPERS) to pay for post-employment retirement benefits.
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CALPERS payments were calculated based actuarial methodologies and the investment
policy of the CAPERS Board of Directors. Due to the recession and changes in
investment assumptions by CALPERS, cities’ payments into the system have greatly
increased, from slightly less than $500 million annually in 2000 to $7 billion in 2010
(Kilgour, 2011). In response to these and other fiscal pressures, many government
agencies have reverted to austerity measures, a “hollowing out” process that dramatically
reduced personnel and services to the public (Warner & Clifton, 2014, p.46).
Specifically addressing how policing has been impacted by recessionary forces,
the Federal Office of Community Oriented Policing’s expansive 2011 report documented
the steady rise of sworn police in the US until 2008 and the drastic reductions in
succeeding years, including about 10,000 officers laid off nationally.
Size of the Police Force
If uniformed police officers are easily recognizable, their individual and collective
value in their communities as crime fighters (deterrence) were grounds for some debate.
Chief among these was the size of the force, but also of concern was their heavy footprint
on a cities’ budget and the effectiveness of the strategies they employ. D'Alessio and
Stolzenberg (1998) helpfully outlined three competing theories in this area where the role
and size of a police force has an impact; deterrence, crime-punishment, and
incapacitation. Incapacitation having been addressed above, deterrence refers to the
ability of the police to deter criminal activity, and crime-punishment suggest criminals
may avoid criminality if effective punishment was assured (Becker, 1968; D'Alessio &
Stolzenberg, 1998). Influences driving the size of a police department’s sworn workforce
has not been abundantly studied, especially as it relates to smaller cities. Examining the
reason for the size of police forces in larger American cities has led writers to
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hypothesize the size of police forces were driven by a “social-control phenomenon”
engineered to control minority groups (Sharp, 2006, p.305; Garland, 2001). Sharp’s
(2006) analysis named variables affecting the size of the force such as legacy staffing
issues, the financial health of a city, and social control needs following civil disturbances.
As to how effectively police fulfill their role as crime fighters, Marvell and
Moody (1996) contributed significantly to the understanding of how police staffing
impact crime. They effectively synthesized arguments for and against the theories of
causality: does crime impact the police or do police impact crime (Marvell & Moody,
1996)? They examined 36 studies and found strong evidence more police did not always
reduce crime but that but higher crime resulted in more police (Marvell & Moody, 1996).
Analyzing 20 years of UCR data and police staffing ending in 1992 for 49 states and over
50 cities, estimated police staffing levels do have a significant impact on most urban
crimes (Marvell & Moody, 1996). More recently, doubts have arisen about the efficacy
of attributing crime drops to specific policing strategies, couched as they were within a
broader sociological construct including, among other variables, race and economics
(Blumstein and Wallman, 2006).
Levitt (2004) also argued increasing police officers was one of four factors
responsible for historic crime reductions of the 1990’s, along with the increased rate of
incarceration (incapacitation), the shrinking crack epidemic and the increased abortion
rate. Interestingly, in the same study, Levitt discounted widely used policing strategy
initiatives such as COMPSTAT as having a positive effect on crime rates. Eck and
Maguire’s (2006) reviewed similar data and questioned the ability to measure police
force size and crime rates since both sometimes increase simultaneously, effectively
mirroring each other. Chalfin (2013) used 50 years of crime data and police force sizes
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of 252 cities to quantify police effectiveness thusly: a dollar spent on hiring a police
officer resulted in $1.60 savings in cost of reduced victimization. Levitt (1998) estimated
one officer added to the force accounts for five additional crimes reported to the police
annually.
Police funding. Critical to the current analysis of police staffing was
acknowledging the impact of President Bill Clinton and the 103rd Congress’ foray into
law enforcement hiring, the Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of 1994. A
major goal of this bill was the hiring of 100,000 new officers nationwide through
competitive grants (USGPO, 1993). Some 65,000 were hired by 2005 (Evans and
Owens, 2007). Zhao and Thurman (2004) identified a reduction in crime thanks to grantfunded hires in cities with populations larger than 10,000. Worrall and Kovandzic (2010)
examined data from 1990-2001 and found a correlation between the addition of federally
funded officers and a reduction in serious crimes in larger US cities. Evans and Owens
(2007) also saw drops in burglaries, vehicle thefts, robberies, and assaults in the years
following the hiring of federally subsidized officers. In contrast, Mulhausen (2001) held
that particularly as to violent crime, there was not a statistically measurable effect after
the federal government subsiding hiring of local law enforcement officers.
Police staffing. The net effect on crime by this national hiring incentive aside,
most local law enforcement agencies were impacted by issues closer to home when
staffing issues were examined. Wilson and Weiss (2014) studied the staffing practices of
20 police agencies nationwide, including some under duress from the current recession
and analyzed the strengths and weaknesses of methods employed such as per-capita,
minimum staffing, and workload-based methods. While acknowledging the challenges of
staffing related to recruitment and retention, they concluded that some police agencies
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lack an evidence-based method to determine appropriate staffing levels (Wilson &
Weiss, 2014). In terms of trends in California, the cumulative statistics on staffing
provided by the state’s agencies to the attorney general were instructive.
Data in Table 3 was from the state’s attorney general’s Criminal Justice Statistics
Center (CJSC) website and shows the difference in staffing for four major categories of
California sworn law enforcement from 2007, at the outset of the recession, and 2012, the
latest year for which figures were available (CJSC, 2014). The total law enforcement
number includes prosecutors, defense attorneys, their investigators and non-sworn
professional staff and was provided for reference in the final row.
Table 3
A total of all sworn and non-sworn law enforcement staffing from 2007-2012, as reported
to the attorney general
_______________________________________________________________________
Category
2007
2012
Percentage Change
________________________________________________________________________
Municipal Police
55,941
51,376
-8.16
Sheriff’s Deputies

51,021

51,384

.71

Highway Patrol

7,469

7,418

-.66

Probation Officers

9,891

13,110

31.34

155,503

149,353

-3.95

Total Law Enforcement

Finally, although the weight science gives to increasing the number of officers as
a crime reduction force has been examined, research into the loss of officer positions has
not been examined as fully. The Rand Corporation examined the cost attributed to
subtracting police and found robust evidence that the loss of officers, in this case 12% of
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Toledo, Ohio’s contingent in 2009, extrapolated to 32 million in losses and 428
additional crimes in one year (Heaton, 2010).
Effectiveness of policing strategies. The ability of police forces to prevent crime
or arrest violators were often the product of the strategies implemented to that end. An
early but influential examination of policing strategies comes from Wilson and Boland
(1978) who emphatically support the notion that aggressive policing can reduce crime
and victimization. Wilson and his colleague Kelling (1982) first coined the term “broken
windows” to describe neglected neighborhoods becoming crime havens, and presumably
whose fortunes could be altered by intervention, especially but not exclusively involving
law enforcement. Evidence shows directed police activity has an effect on crime in the
area being targeted, expressed as either “displacement” or “diffusion” (Weisburd &Telep,
2014). Displacement refers to crime simply being pushed elsewhere, not an altogether
positive result, or the more desirable diffusion as crime was reduced as police focus on
hot spots (Weisburd & Telep, 2014). Further evidence that the mere presence of officers
had positive outcomes was presented by Di Tella, & Schargrodsky (2004), who
documented decreases in auto theft, among other crimes, when officers flooded
neighborhoods in which there were synagogues following an anti-Semitic terror attack in
Argentina in 1994.
How well police deter crime was difficult to gauge, with some writers holding
that a robust police presence deters crime, while others believed this presence only
displaces crime. Even when displacement occurs, Telep and Weisburd (2012) believed
this was not necessarily negative, since some criminal activity was focused on a
particular place because of its value to the criminal; displacement may mean elimination.
A more aggressive police force targeting known problem areas may lead to arrests and
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lower crime, but may lead to charges of racial profiling and its accompanying loss of trust
and litigation directed at perceived rights violations (Withrow & Dailey, 2012).
Arrests were one way to measure work done by police, and these data often
correlate with the number of officers in service. Table 4 captures arrests statewide for
misdemeanor and felony offences from 2007 to 2012, the latest year these data were
available to the attorney general (CJSC, 2014). This table suggests there were nearly
300,000 fewer arrests made in 2012 than in 2007.
Table 4
Felony and misdemeanor arrests made throughout the state of California as reported to
the attorney general from 2007-2012.
________________________________________________________________________
Year
2007
2008
2009
2010
2011
2012
Misdemeanor 992,588

1,010,038

970,221

918,279

825,455

792,297

Felony

499,628

466,441

448,552

419,914

429,807

523,276

________________________________________________________________________
California Prison Reform
As prison reform did not solely originate with AB 109, the following is a partial
list of reform drivers that set the stage for realignment and its progeny.
Little Hoover Commission
Created early in the 1960s through legislative fiat, the Little Hoover Commission
has served as a bipartisan oversight of various governmental efforts including prison
reform (D’Elia, 2010). The Commission’s 2007 warning to California policy makers
about reforming the state’s correctional system was illustrative of the complicated
process that led to AB 109. At that time the Commission partnered with the Stanford
Law Center to address the looming issue of prison overcrowding. The report’s title
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served to alert readers as to the Commission’s findings without going past the title page:
“Solving California’s Corrections Crisis: Time is Running Out.” The report issued by the
Commission (2007), replete with words like, “crisis”, “disaster”, and “tailspin” (p.ii), was
not made in a vacuum. Predating the Commission’s report by four months Governor
Schwarzenegger (2006) issued a formal state of emergency related to overcrowding,
convening the legislature in emergency session. The governor’s declarations outlined the
state’s deficiencies and ordered the CDCR to, among other items, investigate outsourcing
living space for current inmates and transferring inmates outside the state
(Schwarzenegger, 2006).
The Commission’s efforts not only listed deficiencies but proposed solutions,
challenging Governor Schwarzenegger and the legislature that “to ensure public safety,
reforms will have to jettison posturing to make room for smart on crime policies” (Little
Hoover Commission, 2007, cover letter). As it turns out, the impetus to substantially
reform California’s prison system was left to the courts, and reform addressing the
Commission’s findings did not come until late 2011.
Impacting overcrowding directly was the sentencing structure then in place,
which according to the Commission (2007) forced judges to sentence certain inmates to
the least cost effective method available to them-state prison. In 2007 dollars, this meant
each inmate housed by the state cost $37,000 annually (Little Hoover Commission,
2007). The Commission’s findings were broadly summarized as follows:
1. Implement a comprehensive strategy to reduce prison overcrowding and improve
public safety
2. Implement evidence-based policies to reduce overcrowding and hold offenders
accountable for improving themselves
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3. Establish a sentencing commission to guide the state’s criminal justice sentencing
policies to enhance public safety
Thus the Commission (2007) foreshadowed the essence of realignment by directly
addressing the transfer of responsibility from the state to counties:
The state should reallocate resources to assist communities in expanding
community-based punishment options for offenders who violate the terms
of post-release supervision. Working with communities, the state should
reallocate resources to establish a continuum of alternatives to prison,
including electronic monitoring, day reporting centers, drug treatment, jail
time and other community-based sanctions. (p.v)
A dissenting voice. The Commission’s call for reform was not unanimous; a
member of the state assembly, Audra Strickland, pointed out that the incapacitative
nature of California’s existing system could be at least partially credited with lowering
crime rates, and criticized the Commission for defining effectiveness on recidivism rates,
not public safety (Little Hoover Commission, 2007).
More recent Commission findings. In late 2011, just before implementation of
realignment, the Commission sent a letter to Governor Brown urging the transfer of
responsibility for inmates to community corrections be properly resourced to avoid
potential public safety concerns. The Commission pointed out that leaving community
correction alternatives unfunded or subject to the vagaries of annual budget fights could
endanger the public and offenders as well, since realignment funding was not
constitutionally protected like school funding (Little Hoover Commission, 2011).
As late as 2013, the Commission asked the Governor and legislature to revisit
funding infrastructure of realignment, since financial oversight and reporting were not
47

part of the law and the efficacy of the 2 billion already spent was not known (Little
Hoover Commission, 2013).
SB 18 Non Revocable Parole
In 2010, the California Senate passed and Governor Schwarzenegger signed
Senate Bill 18, reforming the state’s parole rules. Prior to SB 18, an inmate out on parole
in California could be found in technical violation of parole for such things as leaving
their home county without permission, associating with known felons, or testing positive
for drugs (Special Report, 2011). These violations brought to the attention of the Parole
Board could result in a new prison term of up to six months for violation of parole
(Special Report, 2011). SB 18 changed this status quo. In addition, SB 18 tasked the
CDCR with evaluating parolees through the use of a validated risk assessment tool, and
those inmates found to be at low risk were designated Non Revocable Parolees (NRP). A
NRP parolee could not be reinterred in the state prison solely for a technical violation of
their parole terms, like leaving his/her home county, and was not under traditional
supervision. An NRP inmate could only return to state prison upon a conviction for a new
felony offense (CDCR, 2014). Unfortunately, mistakes in assessing and assigning risk
led to inmates being released that the state later deemed dangerous, and hundreds of
inmates were recalled into custody (Special Report, 2011). The state inspector general’s
report on the matter (Special Report, 2011) advised between 1,000 and 2,000 inmates
were released from custody under SB 18 who should not have been.
Efficacy of Prison and Corrections Reform Efforts
Realignment was not the first time California has enacted a program to subsidize
communities to take over responsibility in supervising convicted felons. In 1965,
California adopted the Probation Subsidy Act, which paid counties to supervise inmates
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locally instead of being housed by the state, resulting in a 30% reduction of inmate
population and the closure of eight prisons (Warren, 2009; Rashford, 2012). When the
Act became the target of those who thought inmates prematurely released from prison
constituted a public safety threat, funding from the state was eliminated, county probation
departments became dependent on irregular local funding, and more inmates found their
way back to state facilities (Warren, 2009). A lack of realistic funding coupled with
displaced prisoners doomed the Act, since sheriffs connected these two aspects with an
increase in crime (Misczynski, 2011).
By 1995, the United States surpassed other Western industrialized countries as
having the highest rates of incarceration per capita (Chambliss, 2001). Zimring and
Hawkins (1991) opined that California counties enjoyed a “free lunch” at the expense of
the state; local juries, prosecutors, and probation officials arresting, convicting and
sentencing inmates to state prison for crimes committed locally. Their findings suggested
since counties elected sheriffs, prosecutors, and judges, and impaneled juries that
reflected the values of the community, conservative get-tough counties unfairly burdened
the rest of the state (Zimring & Hawkins, 1991). Ball (2012), built on this theory and
analyzed the disparity within two similarly situated California counties, Riverside and
Alameda. Ball (2012) argued that these two counties convicted and sentenced inmates at
vastly disparate rates to the state prison system, Riverside more so than Alameda. Ball
(2012) used these two counties because of their consistent track record of either a
progressive or conservative constituency. Since Riverside was tougher on crime, and
sent many more inmates to the state facilities than Alameda, Riverside enjoyed a greater
share of the benefits of the state penal system than its sister county (Ball, 2012).
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In terms of cost efficiency, the net effect of housing a prisoner in a California
prison grew from $37,000 annually in 2007 (Little Hoover Commission) to $48,500
annually in 2012, or compared to the national average of $26,000, a difference of 87%
(Heyer, 2012). Prisoners with special needs due to health complications and those over
the age of 55 were even more expensive, even with the 2 billion dollars spent annually on
inmate health care (Heyer, 2012).
SB 678 and SB x318
State Senate bills 678 and x318 were efforts to reform probation and parole
programs, respectively. SB 678 was designed to monetarily incentivize probation
departments and place offenders in programs with strong evidence of successfully
reducing recidivism (Warren, 2009). SB x318 passed as court challenges the state’s
status quo reached its apex, required state parole to use a validated risk assessment to
identify inmates risk to re-offend (Petersilia, 2009). Similar to Non Revocable Parole,
inmates deemed low risk would face no active supervision or be subject to technical
violation and a return trip to state custody (Petersilia, 2009).
Coleman, Plata and the Courts
Coleman. In 1990, Ralph Coleman, an inmate in Pelican Bay State Prison
suffering mental health issues, claimed he was unable to receive appropriate and timely
treatment. Coleman sued the state in district court, alleging he and other similarly
afflicted inmates were denied proper care and eventually prevailed in 1995 (Coleman,
1995). The court’s findings on Coleman did not address the issue of overcrowding, but
Coleman prevailed on a claim of “insufficiency of service” (Coleman, 1995, p. 1307).
The court was swayed by pervasive evidence of state neglect; the one and only doctor
assigned to Coleman’s prison could not tell the court how many prisoners were under his
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care (Coleman, 1995). The court imposed a special master to oversee ordered remedies,
but 12 years later the situation had reached crisis levels (Flynn, 2013).
Plata. In response to the threat of reformers challenging the government on
overcrowding issues, Congress passed the Prison Litigation Reform Act of 1996 (PLRA).
The Act made it harder for plaintiffs challenging prison conditions nationwide as it
removed the ability of a single federal judge to mandate prison population reductions in
favor of a three-judge panel (Schlanger, 2013). Despite this uphill battle an inmate
named Marciano Plata brought a suit against the state in 2001, alleging California’s
corrections establishment was incapable of providing even basic medical treatment to
inmates (Plata, 2005). By 2007, the class action suits brought by Coleman and Plata
were joined and were heard together by a three-judge panel of 9th Circuit Court judges
(Flynn, 2013).
Despite the difficulties PLRA placed on plaintiffs like Coleman and Plata, once
empaneled, the judges reviewing conditions in California pulled no punches in declaring
the state’s ability to provide appropriate medical services to prisoners as “broken beyond
repair” (Plata, 2005, p.1). Judge Thelton Henderson, in particular, noted the CDCR was
incapable of reducing prison populations to acceptable levels independently, a condition
which demanded direct intervention by the courts into an activity properly overseen by
the executive branch (Plata, 2005). The panel worked through an appointed receiver to
establish the actual percentage the state would be allowed to house over its capacity. One
court appointed receiver, Robert Sillen, reported to the panel and the Little Hoover
Commission that the CDCR’s inability to accomplish this task was partially a product of
the dysfunctional culture within the CDCR as well as the state Departments of Finance
and Human Resources (2006).
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The three-judge panel. The central point decided by the three-judge panel was
the percentage of overpopulation that California could maintain while not violating the
Eighth Amendment. That number was set at 137.5% over capacity, or 110,000 inmates,
to be accomplished by mid-2013 (Pennypacker & Thompson, 2013). Since California
had tens of thousands of inmates over the 137.5% envisioned by the courts, the state had
to find ways to reduce its population forthwith. The panel’s blueprint to reduce
population was challenged by the state before the U.S. Supreme Court, which upheld the
panel’s decision in late 2010; the final nail on the coffin for the status quo (Flynn, 2013).
Table 5, adapted from a report from California’s Legislative Analyst Office
(Taylor, 2012), shows the population numbers that should have existed within CDCR for
the state to comply with the order of the three-judge panel.
Table 5
Estimated Inmate Population Reductions to Meet Federal Court Ruling.
________________________________________________________________________
Court Imposed
Design
Population
Population
Deadline
Capacity Limit
Limit
Limit
________________________________________________________________________
December 27, 2011

167.0%

133,000

11,000

June 27, 2012

155.0

123,000

10,000

December 27, 2012

147.0

117,000

6,000

June 27, 2013

137.5

110,000

7,000

Two Year Total

34,000

________________________________________________________________________
Relative to the pre-realignment September 28, 2011 population of 144,138 inmates.
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By July 2013, thanks in large measure to realignment, the state had reached a
recent low point in population, but still over the court-ordered maximum, and numbers of
inmates actually started to creep up (Pennypacker & Thompson, 2013).
AB 109 Legislation and Implementation
The California legislature passed AB 109 in the spring and it became effective
October 1, 2011. Despite the inexorable movement towards reform outlined above,
realignment was championed by a single political party and moved expeditiously through
the legislature without the benefit of traditional hearings (Rushford, 2012). The
following is a review of the literature revolving its implementation and impact among
justice stakeholders.
Components of realignment. Realignment was designed to shift the
responsibility for certain convicted felons to the state’s 58 counties. Fazzi (2013)
outlined the components of the law that impacted county sheriff and probation
departments:
1. Counties exercise complete control over "low-level" felons: non-violent, nonserious, and non-sexual, and who also has no prior convictions for any serious, violent, or
sexual crime
2.

Counties supervise "mid-level" felons upon release from prison: not low-level

but whose commitment offense is neither serious nor violent is a "mid-level" felon.
3.

Counties incarcerate "high-level" felons who violate their parole conditions:

a felon whose commitment offense is a serious or violent felony or a third strike offense,
or who is a high-risk sex offender or possesses a mental disorder, and found to have
violated parole terms.
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With these three categories of felons being made the responsibility of the
counties, funding to pay for jail space, training, treatment, and supervision became a
matter of high consequence to county officials (Pennypacker & Thompson, 2013).
AB 109 funding mechanism. Funding for realignment was to substantively
come from a small portion of the sales tax and vehicle license fees; to be forwarded
directly the 58 counties to assist them in paying for infrastructure, personnel, and
programs (Misczynski, 2011). This funding stream was clearly insufficient, and further
funding would require impetus from the governor and approval by the legislature, thus
making it a potential annual political football to be negotiated by those actors
(Misczynski, 2011). Unlike funding for schools, there was no constitutionally protected
funding stream for realignment (Little Hoover Commission, 2011). More recently,
passage of Proposition 30 by the voters has stabilized taxes rates which in turn secured a
portion of realignment’s future funding (Flynn, 2013). Counties received $450 million,
$850 million, and 1 billion in the first three fiscal years of implementation, respectively
(Flynn, 2013). On the state’s side of the ledger, realignment constituted immense
savings; with reductions in inmates housed and supervised, California was projected to
save an estimated 1.7 billion in fiscal 2014-2015 (Taylor, 2012).
Counties used the little-known Community Corrections Partnerships (CCPs),
formed under AB 678, consisting of seven executive members: the chief probation officer
as chair, the sheriff, the district attorney, the public defender, the presiding judge of the
superior court, one representative from either the department of social services or mental
health, and a single police chief (BSCC, 2014). In essence, the CCPs served as the policy
making and budget approving body for each of the 58 counties as to realignment monies.
Deciding what priorities would be addressed became the first focus, precisely as
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realignment intended: empowering officials at the lowest level of government and
closest to the needs of the community. The result of a survey of CCPs by the BSCC at
Table 6 was illustrative of priorities in the early stages of realignment implementation
(BSCC, 2014).
Table 6
Results of a BSCC 2013 survey of each CCP to rank the local priority areas for FY 201112, 2012-13 and 2013-14, items ranked 1-9, most important being 1.
________________________________________________________________________
Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year
Fiscal Year
2011-2012
2012-2013
2013-2014
1. Staffing
1. Staffing
1. Staffing
2. Health
2. Health
2. Health
3. Risk Assessment
3. Day Reporting
3. Day Reporting
4. Staff Training
4. Data
4. Data
5. GPS
5. Risk Assessment (tie)
5. Risk Assessment
6. Day Reporting
5. Staff Training (tie)
6. GPS
7. Data
7. GPS
7. Staff Training
8. Law Enforcement
8. Medical
8. Medical
9. Medical
9. Law Enforcement
9. Law Enforcement
________________________________________________________________________

Recidivism. Defining and exploring recidivism was key to the measurement of
realignment’s success or shortcomings. Merely defining recidivism was complicated by
the varied definitions within the literature (Jancic, 1998), and sensitivity among
stakeholders with the advent the realignment (Tafoya, et al, 2014). Beck (2001)
explained recidivism was also defined differently based on organizational needs or roles
that can vary between diverse but related stakeholders such the police and drug treatment
professionals. In California, with its unique parole model in place previous to
realignment, reform efforts to reduce the staggering effect of unchecked recidivism took
the form of the Preventing Parolee Crime Program. Under this program, early results
showed some promise, Zhang, (et al, 2006) finding that engaged participants were at
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reduced risk of incarceration. To illustrate the difficulty in addressing underlying causes
of recidivism an analysis of therapeutic communities within prison just three years later
by same researcher found no difference in reducing re-incarceration (Zhang, et al, 2009).
Realigned probationers showed a reduced proclivity to recidivate (Pennypacker &
Thompson, 2013), but also a third of these inmates had active warrants for violation of
their probation terms. Despite these challenges, Petersilia (2011) acknowledged some
people belong in prison, but wrote convincingly that penal policy should not add to the
problem by ignoring rehabilitative efforts that show solid evidence of lasting success.
CDCR defined recidivism “by tracking arrests, convictions, and returns to State
prison”, but primarily by returns to state prison, since this was the foci of the correctional
mission (CDCRa, 2013, p.iv). Even before realignment, CDCR documented a reduction
in three-year recidivism rates from a high of 67.5% in 2005-2006 to 61% in 2008-2009
(CDCRa, 2013). As alluded to earlier, stakeholders such as California’s Bureau of State
Community Corrections (BSCC) and the state’s current Attorney General Kamala Harris’
definition of recidivism was at odds on an important point. The BSCC’s definition
focused on a new conviction within three years of release from prison, while General
Harris holds a new arrest and filing of charges defined recidivism (BSCC, 2014a; Harris,
2014). The difference was significant since recidivism was a primary metric to determine
an inmate’s ability to reintegrate into society, and an arrest did not always result in a
conviction (Weisburg, 2014). Another difference was recidivism’s more stringent
definition could color how the effectiveness of realignment was judged.
Effects on justice system stakeholders. Salins and Simpson (2013) pointed to
the likelihood that realignment had only shifted California’s overcrowding from prison to
county jails, a view echoed by the Little Hoover Commission (2013). The net impact of
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realignment by mid-2012 was that 207,000 felons within the state of California still be
fall under the traditional correctional model in housing and parole due to the violent or
serious nature of their offenses, and some 46,000 would be housed and supervised locally
(Males and Buchen, 2013). Many of state’s 480 jails were small facilities within police
departments, and with one-third of counties already under court orders to fix
overcrowding, new inmates would most certainly lead to early releases (Fazzi, 2013).
County probation departments, overwhelmed with their new responsibilities, “lack the
necessary information to make the best service and sanctioning decisions”, in part due to
their information gathering and sharing limitations (Tafoya, et al, 2013, p.19).
Impact of realignment. Two studies that emerged in early 2013 analyzed 2012
crime data for 67 California cities, the first full year subsequent to realignment’s
implementation. Scheidegger (2013) made the connection between realignment and the
state’s increases in crime, which he labeled “California crime spike, particularly in the
face the national crime trends. The nation violent crime rate rose 1.2% and California
cities rose 2.9%, and as for property crime, the nation enjoyed a .8% drop while
California cities rose 9.7% (Scheidegger, 2013).
Males and Buchen (2013) acknowledged the increase of crime in 2012 and
focused on the counties as well as cities, at least in terms of realignment prisoners that
resided in those counties. By analyzing the state’s 21 most populous counties and the
percentage of realigned offenders they housed, they argued counties with a higher
percentage of realigned offenders should have reported higher increases in violent crime.
The ten high-realignment counties managed 22.5% of their offenders locally while the 11
low-realignment counties managed 15.5% of their offenders locally. While both groups
reported increases in crime, the ten high realignment counties actually had lower violent
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and property crime rates than the 11 low realignment counties (Males & Buchen, 2013).
These findings led the writers to believe realignment could not be blamed for an increase
in crime, although neither study examined smaller, poorer jurisdictions.
Lofstrom and Raphael (2013) of the Public Policy Institute of California (PPIC)
stated unequivocally that robust evidence exited that realignment had an impact in the
7.5% statewide increase in property crime, but were unconvinced the 18,000 additional
felons on California streets moved the dial on violent crime. They also compared the
7.5% increase in property crime to the national drop in property crime as strong evidence
realignment played a part (Lofstrom & Rafael, 2013). They reasoned since realigned
inmates and others displaced by realigned inmates were designated as such because of
their propensity to commit low-level or property crime, an increase in these crimes could
be anticipated. In stark contrast, Males and Goldstein (2014) found no conclusive
evidence of a connection between crime and post-realignment California, and specifically
discounted findings by the PPIC of a causal connection between realignment and
property crimes such as motor vehicle theft. Males and Goldstein maintained that if
realignment was connected to an increase in crime, those counties with a higher
percentage of realigned prisoners in their midst would see greater increases; something
their study did not support (Males & Goldstein, 2014).
Other outcomes. Split sentencing, one of realignment’s most unique aspects,
was found to be unevenly distributed in the counties in early examination (Pennypacker
& Thompson, 2013). As an example, Stanislaus County assigned 86% of its inmates to
split sentences, while Los Angeles County sentenced only 6% of its inmates to jail and
supervision, leading Pennypacker and Thompson (2013) to believe some inmates were
missing out on opportunities to receive help from post-release programming. Another
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unintended consequence of realignment; the drop in population of the state run fire
camps, low level inmates enlisted to help suppress fires were reduced, forced the state to
hire federal firefighters at a much higher cost (Taylor, 2012).
Conclusions
The literature examined above has provided evidence that California’s embrace of
an incapacitative approach to crime to include three strikes resulted in increasing rates of
incarceration not supported by the resources for housing and managing 170,000 inmates.
These levels of incarceration without sufficient supporting infrastructure of housing,
medical, and psychological care resulted in deficiencies that reached crisis levels. The
status quo proved unacceptable by the courts who were asked to square existing
conditions in California’s prisons with constitutional proscriptions against cruel and
unusual punishment. There was scholarly debate about the value of deterrence compared
with incapacitation.
The literature has outlined the extant methods by which the government accounts
for crime reported to the police and the challenges of accurately documenting criminality
in a given community, given socio-economic differences and relationships with police.
The challenges faced by California’s municipalities with the onset of the great recession
have been documented as well as their impact on government’s primary function, that of
maintaining public safety. Police sworn staffing has been showed to have been reduced
along with other services by cash strapped municipalities. The efficacy of police in
deterring crime has also been addressed, the literature being contradictory as to whether
additional police reduces criminal activity. Some writers found that police and crime
rose independently but simultaneously, making it difficult to quantify the value of adding
police. Other writers quantified the value of each added officer’s presence, as well as the
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cost of a realigned prisoner’s freedom. Gascon & Foglesong (2010) struck a middle
ground by acknowledging the greater burdens placed on police than in generations past,
and that either crediting or ignoring the value of added police was risky in a
fundamentally complex environment.
Emerging information regarding the impact of California’s response to its
overcrowding crisis known as realignment was examined. Not surprisingly,
contradictory findings regarding the impact of tens of thousands of inmates flooding
California jails and perhaps returning prematurely to California communities made it
difficult to determine whether in the short-term, realignment has succeeded in
maintaining public safety as its primary goal. The state prisons were at their lowest
levels of population in decades but still overcrowded, recidivism rates were lower, but
property crime rates grew in the first full year after realignment.
The literature showed that realignment has accomplished one of its main
objectives; shifting the burden of some 30,000 inmates to community corrections.
Rappaport’s “shell game” (2013, p. 210), and Schlanger’s “hydra threat” (2012, p.191)
were attempts to describe the impacts of realignment on local communities and their law
enforcement professionals. County sheriff and probation departments were immediately
impacted upon implementation, in some cases resulting in jails releasing uninvolved
occupants early to make room for realigned prisoners (Lawrence, 2013). The
overcrowding and accompanying early release of realigned and other inmates who would
otherwise be in jail became the burden first for sheriffs, then probation departments, but
ultimately for local law enforcement. Probation departments have grown in size, scope,
and responsibility, but have struggled to find their footing in this new world of
community corrections.
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A critical piece of the reform puzzle, funding, was found to be almost nonexistent in regards to local law enforcement. The state allocated money to counties, and
counties delegated to Community Corrections Partnerships the responsibility of setting
priorities and fund initiatives. CCPs focused almost exclusively on building
infrastructure for probation and sheriff departments; usually in the form of program
creation for probation and expanding occupancy in county jails. With one vote on the
CCP, a lone police chief could hardly dictate to remaining members, all representing
county services. Meanwhile, local police agencies have shed thousands sworn officer
positions as a result of the recession and reduced city revenue.
Most of the literature addressed the possible covariance between increases in
police staffing and crime rates were limited to large cities. Most of this literature also
focused exclusively on whether increases in police officer staffing result in lower crime.
There was very little known about the impact of police staffing in smaller, sometimes
rural communities, and a paucity of data exists on property crime when a police force was
reduced. Realignment was still in its infancy, therefore nonexistent was information as to
the judgment of sitting police chiefs as to how crime rates have been affected by the
recession, realignment, jail overcrowding, and the aforementioned officer staffing.
Similarly, there was no information about how effective the chiefs would rate strategies
most likely to have been employed in response to realignment.
It was anticipated that in gathering the targeted data, additional knowledge would
be gained regarding any possible impact realignment has had on smaller California
communities and what strategies employed by local law enforcement have the most
strategic value. Therefore, the purpose of the study, to determine the impact of
realignment on property crimes in smaller California cities that were likely under-
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resourced, and the response of police chiefs to these phenomena was judged relevant
based on a gap in the literature.
The following chapter contains the methodology utilized in order to obtain the
data sought by the research questions of this study. Specifically, Chapter III outlines the
research design and instrumentation intended to obtain and analyze the extant historical
data and non-parametric survey data. The survey designed by the author was presented
in its entirety, along with input from a panel of experts enlisted to assure the survey’s
ability to capture intended data. The following chapter also contains the study’s data
collection and the three statistical tests to be used to analyze findings. Finally, the
chapter contains the study’s limitations.
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CHAPTER III: METHODOLOGY
Overview
This chapter described the methods and procedures that were used to determine
what impact, if any, realignment has had on property crimes reported to the police in
small California cities, defined by this study as municipalities of 25,000 to 50,000
residents with their own police departments. To help identify policies that could lead to
more effective law enforcement in this environment, a survey was sent to police chiefs
represented in the population to obtain their expert opinions on the realignment’s impact
on property crime in their jurisdictions, and the speed and efficacy of response strategies.
Purpose Statement
The primary purpose of this descriptive correlational study was to identify policy
initiatives that could lead to more effective law enforcement against challenges presented
by prison realignment for small California cities. The second purpose of this study was
to determine the relationship, if any, between sworn officer staffing and property crimes
reported to the police from 2010 to 2012.

The third purpose of the study was to

determine the significance of the impact of realignment, sworn officer staffing, the
recession, and jail overcrowding on property crime as perceived by police chiefs.
Finally, it was the purpose to identify the progress and effectiveness of specific strategies
in response to realignment; increased law enforcement partnerships, seeking alternative
funding, altering staffing models, and engaging non-law enforcement stakeholders as
perceived by police chiefs.
Research Questions
This paper proposes to answer the following questions regarding California cities
with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have their own police departments:
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1) To what extent is there a difference in property crimes in 2010 and 2012?
2) To what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer staffing in 2010
and 2012?
3) To what extent is there a correlation between changes in sworn officer staffing
and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012?
4) To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012?
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment
b. The current economic recession
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels
d. County or local jail overcrowding
5) To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the
following strategies responding to realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
6) How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to
realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
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probationers
Research Design
This study was a descriptive correlational study supported by archival data as well
as new data obtained from experts in the field via a survey. As for the archival data, a
quantitative approach was indicated because of the well-established units of measurement
for property crime in communities via the Uniform Crime Report, as well as the number
of sworn police personnel (Patten, 2009). These data were objective in nature, and as
McMillan and Schumacher (2010, p.489) pointed out, were better “gathered and analyzed
numerically”. Patten (2009) also recognized the value of a quantitative approach when
attempting to obtain information from participants, in this case police chiefs, who were
not available for in-depth interviews.
The proposed survey allowed for a timely snapshot of the opinions of participants,
aligned as it with the purpose of the study (McMillan &Schumacher, 2010). The survey
was sent to police chiefs in the population via Survey Monkey, and results were analyzed
using standard analysis software. Values were attached to the possible survey responses
to permit proper analysis later.
Purposive sampling has been defined as processes where subjects were selected
for their unique attributes, and not randomly (Bachmann &Schutt, 2013). Chiefs were
selected to inform on topic of study because of their unique position of knowledge,
perspective and influence over policy (Rubin & Rubin, 2010). These cities were selected
primarily because of population size: more than 50,000 increased the likelihood of
greater resources at their disposal and thus not subject to the vagaries of recessionary
setbacks, and less than 25,000 included many cities policed by the county sheriff, usually
the largest and most resourced law enforcement agency in a county.
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Participants received an introductory letter from the researcher, informing them of
the impending survey that invited them to participate. Chiefs were sent the survey via
email with an introductory paragraph identifying the researcher, explaining the purpose
of the study and the survey, and an invitation to participate via an embedded hyperlink to
the survey’s uniform resource locator (URL).
Population
A study’s population has been described as the largest similar group from which
the study’s findings can be generalized (McMillan &Schumacher, 2010). The population
of this study was police chiefs of California cities with their own police departments and
populations of between 25,000 and 50,000. Data from the 2010 U.S. Census indicates
well over 60 California cities have between 25,000 and 50,000 residents, but a review of
each city’s website show only 56 were policed by their own organic police department,
led by a chief of police. These 56 chiefs make up the population for this study.
Sample
McMillan &Schumacher (2010) described a sample in a quantitative study as the
number of those participants from whom data was ultimately collected. Since the study
was directed at chiefs empowered to dictate the tempo and content of policies, strategies
and their implementation, the study’s population was the chiefs of those cities, and the
sample consists of the 36 chiefs that responded to the survey outlined below.
Instrumentation
Tafoya, Grattet, and Bird (2014) recognized the need to quantify results from
realignment to build on the knowledge of evidence-based practices. They strongly
recommended a unified and collaborative approach to data. This study utilized data from
two primary sources; archival crime rate and officer staffing data, and information
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obtained through the use of the survey. Since no readily available and previously
validated surveys existed that captured data sought by this study, one was designed to
obtain this information. This survey was vetted by a panel of experts consisting of sitting
police chiefs in an effort to address validity.
Survey Focus
The four factors itemized in Survey Question 1 have been identified for
contemplation by the participants because of their prominence in the literature already
outlined regarding the time period immediately before and immediately after
realignment. These factors were realignment, sworn officer staffing, the recession, and
jail overcrowding. Participants were asked to rate each of those four factors as to their
potential influence on property crimes in their cities. The specific language to be utilized
in the survey was listed below.
As well, participants were asked to rate the effectiveness of strategies they may
have employed in response to realignment. These strategies were identified due to their
prominence as previously administered during other periods of adaptation by law
enforcement professionals. The participants were asked to quantify the speed at which
these strategies have been implemented, if at all.
This survey’s design was intended to solicit critical data unique to a city’s chief of
police. Their opinion of the impact of landmark changes to the correctional landscape,
along with descriptive data that did or did not covary with property crime rates in their
cities addressed deficiencies outlined in the problem statement of this study. Also, a
survey method was selected because of the ability to administer questions where credible
data were required from a rather large sample, and was an efficient way to acquire data
that can be generalized using regression analysis (McMillan & Schumacher, 2010).
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Survey Questions 1, 2, and 3 align with Research Questions 4, 5, and 6 and are found in
Appendix A.
Expert Panel. To quantify the survey’s value to police executives as outlined in
the purpose statement and to reinforce validity and reliability, selected members of the
Orange County Police Chiefs’ and Sheriff’s Association were asked to provide feedback
on the survey’s focus and questions, thereby acting as a panel of experts. The
Association meets monthly to coordinate the law enforcement efforts of the three million
residents of Orange County. The Association has members who are chiefs of police of
cities ranging in size from Anaheim (population 336,000) to La Palma (population
16,000).
Validity and reliability. The question of an instrument’s content validity
revolves around its alignment with the domain it seeks to inform (Waltz, Strickland, &
Lenz, 2003), and whether adequate sampling in the instrument addresses the subject
under investigation (Wynd, Schmidt, & Schaefer, 2003). Reliability in an instrument was
strong when steps have been taken to reduce the chance of random error or a change in
circumstances (Bachmann & Schutt, 2013). This panel of nine chiefs comprised of the
most experienced and tenured professionals in their respective departments were uniquely
qualified to judge the survey’s content. Like the population and sample, the panel’s
members addressed realignment during the same time period as policy makers, and could
respond thoughtfully as whether the instrument’s findings could be value to a law
enforcement executive.
The panel was asked to comment on the survey’s focus areas and strategies, and
whether knowledge of employment of these strategies could be beneficial in crafting
future police response to prison reform that realigns inmates from state to community
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corrections.
This effort sought confirmation that the survey questions align with their
knowledge and experience in their jurisdictions, and whether information gathered from
this survey could shed light on the effectiveness of the identified strategies. Panelists
were asked the following questions:
1. I am studying how impactful these four areas were with respect to property
crime rates from 2010 to 2012; Public Safety Realignment, the recession, officer staffing
levels, and jail overcrowding. In your opinion, how well or how poorly do these four
factors correspond with factors impacting property crime rates from 2010 to 2012?
2. I am studying the effectiveness of certain strategies that have been employed
in response to Public Safety Realignment, namely; increasing partnerships with allied law
enforcement agencies, seeking alternative funding solutions such as grants, creating
specialized units or reoriented existing specialized units, and engaging with non-law
enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned probationers. How well or how poorly
do you believe these strategies illustrate what you may have or did employ in response to
realignment?
3. I will soon be asking other chiefs in the state how quickly and how effectively
they implemented these strategies. How helpful would this feedback be to you regarding
the evaluation of your own response to Public Safety Realignment?
The panel provided feedback and their responses tend to validate the premise of
the research questions and the value of the data the study seeks to obtain (See Appendix
B). First, as to the impact upon property crime by the variables listed, eight of nine chiefs
agreed the variables highly corresponded to property crime trends for that time period.
One chief believed the variables somewhat corresponded, and no chiefs believed there
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was no correspondence. As to how well the response strategies in the survey reflected
their own experience, four chiefs answered these strategies highly corresponded with
their own experience, five chiefs said the strategies somewhat corresponded, and no
chiefs said the strategies did not correspond. Third, as to whether knowledge of other
chiefs’ responses to realignment would be helpful to their own evaluative process, five
chiefs said this information would be highly helpful, three chiefs said this would be
somewhat helpful, and one chief said this would not help at all. Due to the
preponderance of responses indicating the survey as designed satisfied the primary
purpose of the study, there were no changes made (See Appendix B).
Data Collection
The first three chapters of this study underwent a review by Brandman
University’s School of Education Quality Review Committee. Once approved by Quality
Review (QR), the University’s Institutional Review Board (BUIRB) assured the proposed
study was in compliance with the University’s high standards for integrity and quality,
and protecting the rights of the study’s participants. Once QR and BUIRB completed
their review and formal approval was received, the author began collecting and analyzing
data as outlined. Data collection consisted of two phases: archival data collection and
collection of survey data.
Archival Data
Crime data. Police departments were required to report to the FBI on their most
serious offences reported to the police for each calendar year. The eight most serious
offences were called Part 1 Crimes and consist of criminal homicide, forcible rape,
robbery, aggravated assault, arson, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft (FBI, 2012).
A total number of these offenses were aggregated and reported publically by the FBI
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through their online portal. Data was gathered for calendar 2010 (Appendix C) and 2012
(Appendix D). These data were in the public domain.
Police staffing data. Each police department reports on the number of its sworn
employees in the same report. These data were in the public domain.
Population data. Population data for 2010 was from the 2010 US Census.
Population data for 2012 was from the California Department of Finance, and consists of
a population estimate for each city based on growth models and 2010 US Census data
(DOF, 2014). The author collected property crimes reported to the police and sworn
officer staffing data on a Word Excel spreadsheet for analytical purposes.
Survey administration. The chiefs in the population received an introductory
letter from the author outlining the nature and purpose of the study inviting them to
participate (See Appendix E). This letter was followed by an informational email also
inviting them to participate. This email outlined the author’s role as a doctoral candidate,
the purpose of the study, and the fact that their participation would be kept confidential.
The email contained a URL linking to the Survey Monkey site and the survey itself.
Once at the survey site, the chiefs were asked to read a section regarding informed
consent, and upon approval could take the survey.
Data Analysis
Three separate tests were used to analyze the data. As to Research Questions 1
and 2, a paired-samples t-test were utilized to identify and measure the difference, if any,
between property crime reported to the police in the calendar year immediately before
(2010) and after (2012) the implementation of realignment. Similarly, a paired-samples
t-test was used to identify and measure the difference, if any, between sworn officer
staffing in the calendar year immediately before (2010) and after (2012) the
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implementation of realignment. The paired-samples t-test was utilized because it allows
the researcher to determine the difference between two means (Patten, 2009), in this case
pre and post property crime data and sworn officer staffing for cities in the sample.
For Research Question 3, Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation test, characterized
a powerful tool not prone to error for non-parametric measurements, was used to
determine the relationship, if any, between differences in property crimes reported to the
police and police officer staffing (Bishara & Hittner, 2012). The Spearman test was
chosen over the more common Pearson product-moment correlation due to the likely
small sample size (n ≈ 40-50).
For Research Questions 4, 5, and 6, using responses to the survey, Friedman’s test
will be used to identify the relationship between property crime in those cities and four
factors previously mentioned, as well as the responses from chiefs as to the speed and
effectiveness of response strategies. Use of Friedman’s test was indicated because of the
non-parametric nature of the results of three or more matched groups (Siegel, 1988).
Also, Friedman’s test was chosen instead of the more common repeated measures
ANOVA test because of the likely small sample and the ordinal nature of the ratings.
Limitations
According to the California Department of Finance, as of 2013 there were 482
incorporated cities within the state (DOF, 2014). Of these, 92 had populations of
between 25,000 and 50,000. Of those 92 cities, 56 have their own municipal police
departments, while the remainder had contractual relationships with their county sheriff
for law enforcement services. Only those 56 cities with their own police departments
will be studied.
This study’s primary limitation was that it deals exclusively with California’s
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realignment law, and none of the other 49 states and territories currently have
realignment efforts underway in anything close to this state’s depth and scale. Second,
this study focuses on realignment’s impact on property crimes reported to the police, and
as such does provide insight on what impact realignment may have had on violent crime.
The third limitation was the size of the population and sample; capturing data on
California’s 56 cities with their own police departments and a population of between
25,000 and 50,000, excludes larger and smaller cities and those policed by their county
sheriff. These limitations therefore limit any inferential conclusion or extrapolations that
could be made outside the state or in jurisdictions outside of California.
Summary
The methodology described above was designed to facilitate the gathering and
analysis of extant, archival data regarding property crime incidents reported to the police
and sworn police officer staffing. The survey was designed to elicit responses from
police chiefs on primary influencers of property crime in their cities, as well as shedding
light on the speed and efficacy of strategic responses to realignment. Together these data
should provide information on the impact of realignment as well as police responses to
realignment not currently in the literature.
Chapter IV presented the data and analyzed the findings. Chapter IV presented
tables containing property crime data and sworn officer staffing reported by the cities for
relevant years, correlational tests conducted on these extant data, and presented the
findings of the survey administered to the chiefs in the population.
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CHAPTER IV: RESEARCH, DATA COLLECTION, AND FINDINGS
Overview
The previous chapter presented the research methodology proposed in order to
gather and analyze data that seek to answer the research questions. The three tests used to
analyze the descriptive archival data as well as the survey’s development and
administration strategy was presented. This chapter will present and analyze findings
from the study. The purpose of the study, research questions, methodology, population
and sample are summarized. An introduction with tables containing data comprising the
descriptive statistics and frequency changes of the population and sample of the study are
presented. Data and a statistical analysis are presented for each of the six research
questions, with the assistance of an accompanying table for clarity.
Purpose Statement
The primary purpose of this descriptive correlational study was to identify policy
initiatives that could lead to more effective law enforcement against challenges presented
by prison realignment for small California cities. The second purpose of this study was
to determine the relationship, if any, between sworn officer staffing and property crimes
reported to the police from 2010 to 2012.

The third purpose of the study was to

determine the significance of the impact of realignment, sworn officer staffing, the
recession, and jail overcrowding on property crime as perceived by police chiefs.
Finally, it was the purpose of the study to identify the progress and effectiveness of
specific strategies in response to realignment; increased law enforcement partnerships,
seeking alternative funding, altering staffing models, and engaging non-law enforcement
stakeholders as perceived by police chiefs.

74

Research Questions
This paper proposes to answer the following questions regarding California cities
with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have their own police departments:
1) To what extent is there a difference in property crimes in 2010 and 2012?
2) To what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer staffing in 2010
and 2012?
3) To what extent is there a correlation between changes in sworn officer staffing
and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012?
4) To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012?
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment
b. The current economic recession
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels
d. County or local jail overcrowding
5) To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the
following strategies responding to realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
6) How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to
realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
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b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
Research Methods and Data Collection Procedures
Data collection consisted of two phases: archival data collection and collection of
survey data.
Archival Data
Crime data. Police departments were required to report to the FBI on their most
serious offences reported them each year. The eight most serious offences were called
Part 1 Crimes and consist of criminal homicide, forcible rape, robbery, aggravated
assault, arson, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft (FBI, 2012). A total number of
these offenses were aggregated and reported publically by the FBI through their online
portal. Data was gathered for calendar 2010 and 2012. These data were in the public
domain.
Police staffing data. Each police department reported on the number of its sworn
employees in the same report. These data were in the public domain.
Population data. Population data for 2010 was from the 2010 US Census.
Population data for 2012 was from the California Department of Finance, and consists of
a population estimate for each city based on growth models and 2010 US Census data
(DOF, 2014). The study utilized property crime data as reported to the police, and sworn
officer staffing data. For analytical purposes, these data were placed on a Word Excel
spreadsheet. These data were in the public domain.
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Survey administration. The police chiefs in the population were sent an
introductory letter from the author outlining the nature and purpose of the study inviting
them to participate. This letter was followed by an informational email also inviting
them to participate. This email outlined the author’s role as a doctoral candidate, the
purpose of the study, and the fact that their participation will be anonymous. The email
contained a URL linked to Survey Monkey wherein the survey could be accessed. Once
at the survey site, the chiefs were asked to read a section regarding informed consent, and
upon approval were able to complete the survey (See Appendix F).
Data Analysis
Three separate tests were used to analyze the data. As to Research Questions 1
and 2, a paired-samples t-test was utilized to identify and measure the difference, if any,
between property crime reported to the police in the calendar year immediately before
(2010) and after (2012) the implementation of realignment. Similarly, a paired-samples
t-test was used to identify and measure the difference, if any, between sworn officer
staffing in the calendar year immediately before (2010) and after (2012) the
implementation of realignment.
For Research Question 3, Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation test was used to
determine the relationship, if any, between differences in property crimes reported to the
police and police officer staffing.
For Research Questions 4, 5, and 6, Friedman’s test was used to identify the
relationship between property crime in those cities and four factors previously mentioned,
as well as the responses from chiefs as to the speed and effectiveness of response
strategies.
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Population
The population of this study was police chiefs of California cities with their own
police departments and populations of between 25,000 and 50,000. Data from the 2010
U.S. Census indicates well over 60 California cities have between 25,000 and 50,000
residents, but a review of each city’s website show that only 56 were policed by their
own police department, led by a chief of police.
Sample
Since the study was directed at chiefs who were empowered to dictate the tempo
and content of policy response and implementation, the study’s population was the chiefs
of those cities, and the sample consists of the 36 chiefs of police who responded to the
survey.
Presentation and Analysis of Data
Table 7 displays descriptive statistics for population, property crime and numbers of
sworn officers for 2010 and 2012. The table also includes change data. Specifically,
percentage changes from 2010 to 2012 were that: (a) population increased (M = 1.34);
(b) raw changes in crimes increased (M = 3.60); (c) raw changes in officers decreased
(M = -5.56); (d) change in crimes per 1,000 increased (M = 2.21); and (e) change in
officers per 10,000 decreased (M = -6.81).
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Table 7
Descriptive Statistics for Selected Data (n = 56)

2010
M
Population
35,627.73
Property Crime
991.50
Officers
46.05
Crimes per
27.64
1,000 People
Officers per
12.91
10,000 people

2012

Percent Change
M
SD
1.34
1.33
3.60
17.61
-5.56
-8.78

SD
6,820.57
484.15
19.77

M
36,109.82
1,032.82
43.70

SD
6,943.65
540.15
18.96

12.14

28.24

13.41

2.21

17.05

4.97

12.06

4.63

-6.81

8.58

Table 8 displays the frequency counts for changes in property crimes and sworn
officers. Based on raw crime numbers, 34 of 56 cities (60.7%) had some sort of increase
while for raw officer numbers, 47 of 56 cities (83.9%) had a decrease in the number of
officers. Using population adjusted data, 57.1% of the cities had increases in their
property crime rate while 85.7% experienced a decrease in the number of sworn officers.
Table 8
Frequency Counts for Changes in Property Crimes and Sworn Officers
Decrease
Property Crime
Officers
Crimes per 1,000 People
Officers per 10,000 people
Note. n = 56

Increase

n
22

%
39.3

n
34

%
60.7

47
24
48

83.9
42.9
85.7

9
32
8

16.1
57.1
14.3
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Research Question 1
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have
their own police departments, to what extent is there a difference in property crimes in
2010 and 2012?
To answer this question, Table 9 displays the relevant paired t-tests. Using raw
data, overall property crimes (p= .06) tended to be higher in 2012 (M = 1,032.82) than in
2010 (M = 991.50). However, when property crimes were adjusted for population, no
difference was found (p = .35)
Table 9
Paired t-tests for Selected Variables Comparing 2010 to 2012
2010
Population
Property Crime
Officers
Crimes per
1,000 People
Officers per
10,000 people
Note. n = 56

2012

M
35,627.73
991.50
46.05

SD
6,820.57
484.15
19.77

M
36,109.82
1,032.82
43.70

SD
6,943.65
540.15
18.96

t
7.86
1.95
4.77

p
.001
.06
.001

27.64

12.14

28.24

13.41

.94

.35

12.91

4.97

12.06

4.63

5.84

.001

Research Question 2
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have
their own police departments, to what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer
staffing in 2010 and 2012?
To answer this question, Table 9 above is used again to display the relevant paired
t-tests. Number of sworn officers declined both using raw data (p = .001) and population
adjusted data (p = .001).
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Research Question 3
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have
their own police departments, to what extent is there a correlation between changes in
sworn officer staffing and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012?
Table 10 displays the relevant Spearman correlations. No significant correlations
were found for either the raw change data (rs = .09, p = .49) or the population adjusted
change data (rs = .08, p = .57).
Table 10
Correlations Comparing Changes in Population, Crimes and Officers (N = 56)

Raw
Population
Property Crimes
Officers
Population Adjusted
Population
Property Crimes
Officers
Note. n = 56

Population

Property Crimes

Officers

1.0
.11
-.01

1.0
.09

1.0

1.0
.04
-.13

1.0
.08

1.0

Research Question 4
To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property crime
within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012?
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment
b. The current economic recession
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels
d. County or local jail overcrowding
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To answer this question, Table 11 displays the ratings for the perceptions of the
factors that led to increases in property crimes. These ratings were based on a four-point
metric: 1 = Not at all significant to 4 = Highly Significant. A Friedman repeated
measures ANOVA test found no significant differences (p = .16) among the four ratings.
Inspection of the table found the highest factor was item 1a, “AB 109 California’s Public
Safety Realignment law (M = 2.71)” and the lowest rated item was item 1c, “My
department’s sworn officer staffing levels (M = 2.17)”.
Table 11
Ratings for Perceptions of the Factors that Led to Increases in Property Crime
M
SD
AB 109 Public Safety Realignment Law
2.71
0.86
County or local jail overcrowding
2.60
1.01
The current economic recession
2.37
0.84
My department’s sworn officer staffing levels
2.17
1.04
Note. n = 35; Ratings were based on a 4-point metric: 1 = Not at all significant to 4 =
Highly Significant. Friedman Repeated Measures Test Result: χ2 (3, n = 35) = 5.21,
p = .16.
Research Question 5
To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the following
strategies responding to realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
To answer this question, Table 12 displays the ratings for the extent that specific
property crime reducing strategies had been implemented. These ratings were based on a
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4-point metric: 1 = Not Considered to 4 = Fully Implemented. A Friedman repeated
measures ANOVA test found significant differences (p = .001) among the four ratings.
Inspection of the table found the highest strategy was item 2a, “Increased partnerships
with allied law enforcement agencies (M = 3.33)” and the lowest rated strategy was item
2d, “Engaged with non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers (M = 2.06)” (Table 12).
Table 12
Ratings for Extent Property Crime Reducing Strategies had Been Implemented
M
3.33

SD
0.63

Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement
agencies
Created specialized units or reoriented existing
2.86
1.17
specialized units
Sought alternative funding solutions such as grants
2.25
1.02
Engaged with non-law enforcement partners to
2.06
1.12
impact or serve realigned probationers
Note. n = 36; Ratings were based on a 4-point metric: 1 = Not at all significant to 4 =
Highly Significant. Friedman Repeated Measures Test Result: χ2 (3, n = 36) = 26.96, p =
.001.

Research Question 6
How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to
realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
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To answer this question, Table 13 displays the ratings for the effectiveness of
specific property crime reducing strategies. These ratings were based on a four-point
metric: 1 = Not at all effective to 4 = Significantly Effective. A Friedman repeated
measures ANOVA test found significant differences (p = .001) among the four ratings.
Inspection of the table found the highest strategy was item 3a, “Increased partnerships
with allied law enforcement agencies (M = 2.85)” and the lowest rated strategy was item
3b, “Sought alternative funding solutions such as grants (M = 1.76)”.
Table 13
Ratings for Extent Property Crime Reducing Strategies had Been Implemented

Increase partnerships with allied law
enforcement agencies
Created specialized units or reoriented
existing specialized units
Engaged with non-law enforcement
partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
Sought alternative funding solutions
such as grants

M
2.85

SD
0.74

2.66

1.07

1.87

0.76

1.76

0.79

Note. n = 36; Ratings were based on a 4-point metric: 1 = Not at all effective to 4 =
Significantly effective. Friedman Repeated Measures Test Result: χ2 (3, n = 31) = 27.69,
p = .001.
Summary
The purpose of this study was to identify the possible impact of realignment on
property crimes for smaller California cities. This impact could have been influenced by
the fewer sworn police officers, crowded jails, and the current economic recession. In
addition to descriptive data that would analyze potential strength of differences, the
opinion of the police chiefs as to the how property crimes were influenced by these
factors, how quickly they responded and how effectively these strategies were in
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responding to realignment. It was a purpose of the study to provide police chiefs with
data that could help address future reform efforts with a net effect of placing offenders
back into the community.
Statistical analysis of the descriptive data indicated an increase in property crimes
for 34 of the 56 cities, but this increase was impactful but not statistically significant.
The analysis did show a statistically significant decrease in sworn officer staffing for 47
of the 56 cities. Analysis comparing property crimes against sworn officer staffing levels
did not identify a correlation between these two variables.
With respect to the survey results, the highest-rated factor which chiefs identified
as impacting property crimes in their jurisdictions was realignment, however, there was
not a significant difference among the other potential factors that could have led to higher
property crime rates in their cities. As to which strategy was implemented faster than the
others presented, chiefs reported increasing partnerships with allied agencies was
completely or partially implemented at a higher rate than the other strategies
contemplated by the survey. Similarly, when asked to rate the effectiveness of the
strategies offered, partnering with other law enforcement professionals was most likely to
be rated as effective or significantly effective as compared to the other three strategy
choices.
In the following chapter, the major findings of the study will be presented in light
of the existing literature. Unexpected findings will also be presented. Conclusions made
as a result of the study, including implications for further research and recommendations
in light of the findings and existing literature, are provided.
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CHAPTER V: FINDINGS, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The previous chapter outlined the data gathered and whether that data pointed to
significant statistical conclusions. This chapter will compare and summarize what was
found in the review of the literature, draw conclusions and implications, and then make a
series of recommendations.
Purpose Statement
The primary purpose of this descriptive correlational study was to identify policy
initiatives that could lead to more effective law enforcement against challenges presented
by prison realignment for small California cities. The second purpose of this study was
to determine differences and relationships, if any, between sworn officer staffing and
property crimes reported to the police from 2010 to 2012. The third purpose of the study
was to determine the significance of the impact of realignment, sworn officer staffing, the
recession, and jail overcrowding on property crime as perceived by police chiefs.
Finally, it was the purpose to identify the progress and effectiveness of specific strategies
in response to realignment; increased law enforcement partnerships, seeking alternative
funding, altering staffing models, and engaging non-law enforcement stakeholders as
perceived by police chiefs.
Research Questions
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that have
their own police departments:
1) To what extent is there a difference in property crimes in 2010 and 2012?
2) To what extent is there a difference in sworn police officer staffing in 2010
and 2012?
3) To what extent is there a correlation between changes in sworn officer staffing
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and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012?
4) To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012?
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment
b. The current economic recession
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels
d. County or local jail overcrowding
5) To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the
following strategies responding to realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
6) How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to
realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
Methodology
Archival property crime and sworn officer staffing data were collected from the
FBI’s Uniform Crime Reports. An online survey was designed and administered to the
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police chiefs in the population. Three tests were used to analyze the collected data. A
paired sampled t-test was used to determine the extent of differences in property crime
and officer staffing for 2010 and 2012. Spearman’s Rank Order Correlation test was
used to determine the relationship, if any, between differences in property crimes
reported to the police and police officer staffing. Finally, Friedman’s test was used to
identify the relationship between property crime in those cities and four factors
previously mentioned, as well as the responses from chiefs as to the speed and
effectiveness of response strategies.
Major Findings
The following will summarize the major findings of this study by research
question.
Research Question 1
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that
have their own police departments, to what extent is there a difference in property crimes
in 2010 and 2012?
The data and subsequent analysis indicates there was a meaningful trend upward
of property crimes between the two relevant years. The difference in property crimes
between 2010 and 2012, however, was not statistically significant. Of the 56 cities
examined, 34 showed an increase in property crimes reported to the police. Importantly,
22 of the cities reported either stable or a great deal fewer property crimes. The disparate
nature of these results are especially stark when reviewing Table 7; one city had nearly a
31% decrease in property crimes pre and post implementation while another city suffered
a nearly 72% increase in property crimes over the same period.
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While some might see these findings as contradictory, the disparate nature of
increases and decreases in property crime in the post realignment era is consistent with
recent findings which led some writers to discount realignment’s impact on crime
increases (Males & Buchen, 2013) while others provided evidence California’s recent
increases in property crime correlated to the addition of 18,000 inmates into the
community (Lofstrom & Raphael, 2013). In addition to the 56 cities in the sample,
California as a whole had greater increases in property crime than the other 49 states
(Scheidigger, 2013; FBI, 2012). Clearly, California led the way in an increase in
property crime during this period, but the data is contradictory as to a correlation with the
implementation of AB 109.
Research Question 2
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that
have their own police departments, to what extent is there a difference in sworn police
officer staffing in 2010 and 2012?
The study found numbers of sworn police officers serving in the police
departments within the population decreased significantly. Only eight departments
actually increased their sworn officer staffing during this period, but 48 saw their
numbers decline (Table 8). The average department in the study lost about two officers
over this three-year span. These findings are consistent with what has occurred
statewide, with 3,700 fewer officers policing the streets in California in 2012 compared
to 2008 (FBI, 2012), and the overall disproportionate negative impact on local
enforcement (Petersilia, 2013).
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Research Question 3
Regarding California cities with populations between 25,000 and 50,000 that
have their own police departments, to what extent is there a correlation between changes
in sworn officer staffing and changes in property crime for 2010 and 2012?
This study could not identify a correlation between changes in sworn officer
staffing and property crime for the relevant years studied. It is possible that no
correlation could be identified in part due to the mixed results related to property crimes
in the population during this time period. With almost 40% of the cities in the population
showing stable or fewer property crimes, finding a correlation between property crime
and officer staffing was not supported.
The literature once again suggests divergent views as to what degree increases in
officer staffing lead to lower crimes rates. There is agreement that officer staffing was
driven to lower levels due to the recession (Wilson & Heinonen, 2011). In terms of
deterrence, most support the idea that more officers might be effective in deterring crime
(Levitt, 2004; Guffey, Larson & Kelso, 2010: Ball, 2011; Kleck & Barnes, 2010; Chalfin,
2013; Clear & Frost, 2014), while others believe that more police do not necessarily
reduce crime but higher crime almost always leads to additional police (Marvell &
Moody, 1996).
Research Question 4
To what extent were the following factors significant with respect to property
crime within the jurisdictions from 2010-2012?
a. AB 109 Public Safety Realignment
b. The current economic recession
c. The police department’s sworn officer staffing levels
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d. County or local jail overcrowding
This question was designed to learn the chiefs’ opinions as to what degree the
four factors listed in the survey had an impact on property crime in their jurisdiction. In
descending order, those: factors judged as either significant or highly significant were as
follows: realignment, jail overcrowding, the recession, and officer staffing levels.
Differences among the factors were not statistically significant. Twenty-two of the 36
chiefs completing the survey believed realignment to be a significant or highly significant
factor with respect to property crime from 2010-2012. Interestingly, only 14 chiefs held
the belief that their sworn officer staffing levels were a significant or highly significant
factor related to property crime trends in their jurisdictions for the same time period.
This is meaningful given that 84% of the agencies saw their officer levels fall.
Realignment and subsequent jail overcrowding have previously been identified as
correlated, as well as the negative effect of displaced on local law enforcement
(Schlanger, 2012; Hill, et al, 2013; Lawrence, 2013; Rappaport, 2013). The evidence
suggests realignment has negatively impacted stakeholders, especially among highly
populated counties (Lofstrom & Rafael, 2013). These findings tend to underpin the
concern chiefs had regarding the implementation of realignment and overcrowding in
their local jails.
Research Question 5
To what extent do chiefs perceive that progress has been made in the following
strategies responding to realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
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d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
Chiefs were given the opportunity to report on four strategies they may have
implemented in response to realignment. In descending order of either partially or fully
implemented, chiefs reported increasing partnerships allied law enforcement agencies,
the creation of specialized units, seeking alternative funding, and non-law enforcement
partnering. None of the chiefs reported that he/she had not considered increasing
partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies, and 16 chiefs reported that they had
not even considered engaging with non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve
realigned probationers. These findings point to a significant preference by the chiefs
toward the strategy of increasing partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies, and
little progress in engaging with non-law-enforcement partners to serve realigned
offenders.
Blumenstein and Wallman (2006) cast doubt about the efficacy of specific
policing strategies, especially as they relate to reducing crime, since crime is connected to
complex societal issues that common policing strategies do not address. The survey’s
findings suggest chiefs sought to create effective partnerships with like-tasked agencies
coalesce with other findings that acknowledge realignment funding initially benefitted
county organizations (Petersilia & Lin, 2012; Ducart, 2013).
Research Question 6
How effective do chiefs perceive the following strategies are in response to
realignment?
a. Increase partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
b. Seek alternative funding solutions such as grants
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c. Create specialized units or reorient existing specialized units or assignments
d. Engage non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
For the final research question, chiefs were asked to rate their effectiveness of
these strategies. In keeping with the findings outlined previously, none of the chiefs rated
increasing partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies as “not at all effective.”
Indeed, 22 of the 34 chiefs rated their efforts to increase these partnerships as either
effective or significantly effective. Of the remaining strategies, creating specialized units
of officers to respond to realignment was rated either effective or significantly effective
by 19 of the chiefs. Only seven chiefs rated seeking alternative funding solutions and
engaging with non-law enforcement as either effective or significantly effective.
The proactive nature of the strategies rated most effective by law enforcement
leadership is not surprising, a common response by police although proactive or directed
policing has produced uneven results (Withrow & Dailey, 2012; Weisburd & Telep,
2014; Wilson & Weiss, 2014). To summarize, according to the study participants,
realignment was the most influential factor impacting property crime and increased
partnership with allied law enforcement was the most effective strategy selected and most
aggressively implemented.
Unexpected Findings
Property crime increases were not universal across the population subsequent to
the implementation of realignment; almost 40% of the cities studied saw a decrease in
property crime (Table 8). With almost 84% of the cities in the population sustaining a
concurrent decrease in officer staffing levels, many of the cities that enjoyed a decrease
in property crime also lost police officers over this time period.
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The literature has already found evidence officer staffing levels dropped given the
virulent nature of the great recession on municipal budgets (Kiewiet & McCubbins,
2014). Faced with statistically significant decreases in officer staffing levels among most
of the population, it was unexpected to see the weight the chiefs gave to their sworn
officer losses. They rated realignment, the recession and jail overcrowding as more
influential on property crime than having fewer officers on hand, surprising since most
police chiefs face a constant struggle to defend their department’s resources, made
scarcer since 2008.
Conclusions
The findings of this study lead to the following conclusions:
1. Most of the cities that made up the population of this study saw an increase in
Part 1 property crime from 2010 to 2012. While this difference was not
statistically significant, in part due to the variance in property crimes
population-wide, the fact that so many Californians within the jurisdiction of
this study suffered greater property loss during this time period is impactful
from a public policy standpoint. Research indicates public policy is often
driven by the public’s perception of crime, which historically results in gettough approaches that begin a cycle of prison overcrowding. Policy makers
and legislators should take into account a broad range of public safety
indicators and evidenced-based practices before making reforms, especially
when reforms have the net effect of reversing the incapacitating nature of
keeping repeat offenders in custody.
2. A significant number of the cities within the population of this study saw a
decrease in sworn officer staffing from 2010 to 2012. Couched amidst a
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historic recession, without dedicated funding to respond to realignment, many
police departments represented in this study were bereft of whatever
incapacitative or deterrent effect these officers could have created. The
research supports the idea that recruitment and retention of qualified police
officers is both challenging and critical to public safety. Further attrition of
police officers in these communities has the potential to reach public safety
critical mass as local entities are asked to bear larger burdens in the
supervision and treatment of offenders.
3. For this population and this time period, no statistical correlation can be
established between property crimes and officer staffing. While this finding is
counter-intuitive, other variables not considered in this study could have
played a greater role than the variables presented. Other variables, such as the
relative number of offenders in those communities or the strength of
cooperation between police and probation departments should be explored.
Since the data indicates some agencies lost officers while maintaining or
reducing property crimes, a comprehensive analysis of strategies is
recommended. (See Recommendations for Further Study, below.)
4. Police chiefs strongly believe that realignment had an impact in their
jurisdictions. As chiefs, they would not have waited for a statistical
significance test before addressing a massive reform effort that placed some
part of 18,000 sophisticated offenders in their communities. Since almost
40% of the cities had a decrease in property crime, it is possible strategies
referenced in this study or others not contemplated had the effect of diffusing,
deterring, or preventing crime within their realm of influence. Apart from the
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short-term benefits of zero-tolerance or high enforcement approaches, the data
suggests realignment will require law enforcement practitioners to re-examine
assumptions and conventional approaches. Additionally, the survey indicated
the lack of commitment to non-law enforcement partnerships as a viable
response strategy provides fertile ground for future consideration by police
chiefs.
5. Although this study does not quantify the actual start date of the realignment
response strategies alluded to in the survey, the fact that chiefs promptly
teamed with allied agencies to address realignment and were likely to
promptly re-task their best trained officers may be relevant to determining
why some agencies saw a drop in property crime.
Implications for Action
The analysis and findings of this study echo the clarion call from decades of
research and the stanchions of American jurisprudence.
The pendulum. Penal policy, consisting of sentencing strictures as well as
rehabilitative and reform efforts is not effectively enacted as a result of the popular voice
of the people. The criminal justice pendulum in California, like the nation, swings hither
and yon from pole to pole, often the result of popular will. Making criminal justice
policy by popular demand, subject to political machinations instead of robust, evidencebased public policy fact-finding where sentiment is secondary to practical considerations.
A voter’s version of reform, ranging from three strikes, which many blame for prison
overcrowding, to Proposition 47, is in the proverbial eye of the beholder. Passed by a
vote of the people in November 2014 and made effective immediately, Proposition 47
classified downward entire swathes of the penal and health and safety codes. Billed as a
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way to keep shoplifters and small-time drug users out of state prison, the law made
possession of a controlled substance a misdemeanor, and significantly changed the way
property crimes such as burglary and theft were classified. Three strikes heralded as a
type of reform as well in its day; a call for justice for innocents like Polly Klaas.
Measured against the history of prison reform and get-tough measures, Proposition 47
must seem no less imperfect to the criminologist than three strikes. It therefore appears
the need for the voices of experts in the field, armed with evidence-based practices in real
world situations, should figure more prominently when contemplating criminal justice
legislation.
The Constitution and prison overcrowding. The nation’s highest courts of law
have made it clear; it is against the founding principles of the United States to assume
stewardship over convicted criminals and then neglect basic care only the state can
provide. The realignment experience has been somewhat unique; the glacial journey of
Marciano Plata and Ralph Coleman’s bid for basic care became the impetus for the
highest court to weigh in on the viability of California’s broken prison system. Although
the Coleman/Plata cases were almost a generation in the ripening, and prudent voices
called on governors, legislators, and constituents to act, little was accomplished and the
slow march through the courts became a tsunami of offenders to probation departments,
health providers, and county sheriffs and police chiefs at a low point in sworn officer
staffing. Relying almost exclusively on get-tough approaches and local jails instead of
prisons to lower crime is inefficient and inconsistent with procedural justice. Criminal
justice reform should promote public safety through the use of proven programs and
disciplines that reduce recidivism by addressing foundational issues such as dysfunctional
families and chemical dependency.
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A perfect storm. The funding mechanisms provided for in AB 109 and sister
legislation such as AB 117 were necessarily focused on California’s 58 counties. This
was done so that those agencies most affected by realignment’s mandate, the jails,
probation and health departments, and the courts, would have the wherewithal to house
and treat the sudden influx of realigned inmates. Unfortunately, this left out municipal
law enforcement who serve the majority of the state’s residents, 4,565 fewer peace
officers on the street in California from 2007 to 2012, and a 19% drop in arrests over the
same period (CJSC, 2014). While realignment was not by design a “get out of jail free
card” for realigned inmates, the displacement effect of moving realigned inmates into
county facilities resulted in crowded jails and required sheriffs to find alternatives to
incarceration. Realigned inmates came into a jail’s front door and somebody got kicked
out the back door to make room. In response, police chiefs did what they have always
done. They teamed up and tried and fend off the negative effects of the latest wave of
reform. They did not wait for funding, more officers or scholarly deductions to point
them in a particular direction. They suited up their varsity players and got busy; so busy
that after the initial wave of 38,000 inmates were realigned to counties California’s prison
population is creeping upward and are hiring more parole officers. It must be said that
along the way, police chiefs may have inadvertently entered the fight minus allies
possessing valuable experience treating institutionalized offenders, specifically non-law
enforcement groups like churches, holistic providers, or experts in other non-traditional
methods.
Many law enforcement practitioners might prefer greater attention paid by society
to keeping dangerous felons behind bars. Such steps may include restrictions on Superior
Court judges deemed to be soft on criminals, and tougher requirement enforced for felons
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seeking parole. Greater surveillance of perpetrators by probation departments would be
on the list, along with devising guidelines that would not allow public safety to be
jeopardized by well-intended state initiatives. Yet, these and other “wish list” items are
arguably incompatible with other elements related to the freedoms that most people
enjoy. While fully engaging in a holistic effort to reduce prison precursors such as
chemical dependency, law enforcement should seek partnerships with non-law
enforcement, non-traditional partners such as churches, veterans groups, and education
professionals to reduce recidivism.
Recommendations for Further Research
1. Since the population consisted of cities of a certain populations with their own police
departments, it is not fully known what the property crime trends were for cities
outside the resident population range and serviced by the county sheriff. Future
studies could examine similar variables among the 58 counties or among larger or
smaller cities than represented in this study.
2. Crime is impacted by many variables, and realignment was only one of many forces
driving inmate population. Other variables that could have served to increase or
decrease crime are not adequately identified or studied. Future studies could analyze
variables such as the relative caseload of local probation officers or effectiveness of
drug dependency treatment by local health departments.
3. Since some cities apparently managed to maintain or reduce property crime with
fewer officers than when realignment began, what strategies or influences factored in
that decline are not known. Analyzing the demographics, relative number of
displaced or realigned offenders, community partnership level or relative experience
of the police chiefs in these cities could be relevant.
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4. This study did not distinguish other pertinent but meaningful and well-established
community characteristics such as the level of urban development, unemployment
levels, education levels, poverty and literacy levels. Recent events in Ferguson,
Missouri, among others, point to the importance such factors present to a community.
Additional study could reveal to what degree these variables influence public safety
among cities most impacted by realignment.
5. Police chiefs could have used any number of innovative or groundbreaking strategies
to respond to realignment, but only four were examined. A qualitative study
involving these chiefs or other criminal justice stakeholders could yield strategies or
innovations not contemplated in the study.
6. Apart from property crime rates, other measures of criminality such as recidivism are
being measured in other research, but measuring the relative success of realignment
as a public safety initiative is not fully developed. Comparative analysis between
rates of recidivism and levels of crime reported to the police could shed light on the
interaction between these important measures of public safety effectiveness.
Concluding Remarks and Reflections
Public Safety Realignment, otherwise known as AB 109, was a defensive action
to drastically reduce California’s state prison population in accordance with a federal
mandate. California’s response to shift the burden of nonviolent, non-serious, non-sexrelated sex offenders from state prison to the counties was implemented on a truncated
timeline giving local jurisdictions little time to plan and prepare.
Offenders were placed back into the community, or released outright due to
displacement in local jails. Possibly another offender stepped out to freedom, acting
vicariously as a realigned stand-in, due to overcrowding that migrated from prisons to
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jails. Further, offenders on supervision had a much smaller window to avoid legal
entanglements by being subject to search without probable cause for as little as six
months.
Despite realignment’s shortcomings, it has helped place the state in a firmer
financial footing, and brought California much closer to the court’s mandate limiting
overcrowding to 137% capacity. It has also greatly enhanced cooperation among allied
agencies. Some banded together out of survival but nonetheless forged effective
partnerships. No study is likely to eradicate crime, and how those who break the law
should be treated will always remain controversial. What is important is not that all of
the answers are found, but that people of good will continue to ask the questions.
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APPENDIX A
Survey Question #1: Research indicates property crimes increased in some California
cities from 2010 to 2012. Regarding property crime in your jurisdiction from
2010 to 2012, to what extent were the following factors significant with respect to
increases in property crime?

1)
AB 109 California’s Public Safety Realignment law
Not at all
Slightly
Highly
significant
significant
Significant
significant
1----------------------------2-----------------------------3-------------------------------4
2)

The current economic recession

Not at all
Slightly
Highly
significant
significant
Significant
significant
1---------------------------2------------------------------3------------------------------4
3)

My department’s sworn officer staffing levels

Not at all
Slightly
Highly
significant
significant
Significant
significant
1-------------------------------2---------------------------3----------------------------4
4)

County or local jail overcrowding

Not at all
Slightly
Highly
significant
significant
Significant
significant
1-------------------------------2--------------------------3-----------------------------4
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Survey Question #2: In response to AB 109 California’s Public Safety Realignment law,
some police departments enacted certain strategies to address changes brought
about by realignment. Please rate the extent that you have or are considering
implementing these strategies in response to realignment:

1)

Increased partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies

Not
Considered
Partially
Fully
considered
not yet begun
implemented
implemented
1-------------------------------2----------------------------3---------------------------4
2)

Sought alternative funding solutions such as grants

Not
Considered
Partially
Fully
considered
not yet begun
implemented
implemented
1-------------------------------2----------------------------3---------------------------4
3)
Created specialized units or reoriented existing specialized units
Not
Considered
Partially
Fully
considered
not yet begun
implemented
implemented
1-------------------------------2----------------------------3---------------------------4
4)

Engaged with non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
Not
Considered
Partially
Fully
considered
not yet begun
implemented
implemented
1-------------------------------2----------------------------3---------------------------4
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Survey Question #3: In response to AB 109, California’s Public Safety Realignment law,
some agencies responded by enacting certain strategies to address changes
brought about by realignment. How effective would you rate the following
strategies in responding to realignment?

1)
Increased partnerships with allied law enforcement agencies
Not
Somewhat
Effective
Significantly
at all effective
effective
effective
1-----------------------------------2-----------------------3----------------------------4
2)
Sought alternative funding solutions such as grants
Not
Somewhat
Effective
Significantly
at all effective
effective
effective
1----------------------------------2-----------------------3----------------------------4
3)
Created specialized units or reoriented existing specialized units
Not
Somewhat
Effective
Significantly
at all effective
effective
effective
1----------------------------------2-----------------------3----------------------------4
4)

Engaged with non-law enforcement partners to impact or serve realigned
probationers
Not
Somewhat
Effective
Significantly
at all effective
effective
effective
1----------------------------------2-----------------------3----------------------------4
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APPENDIX B

125

126

127

APPENDIX C
City
Atascadero
Atwater
Azusa
Banning
Beaumont
Bell
Benicia
Beverly
Hills
Brea
Burlingame
Calexico
Campbell
Ceres
Claremont
Covina
Culver City
Cypress
Danville
Desert Hot
Springs
East Palo
Alto
El Centro
Eureka
Foster City
Gilroy
Hollister
La Verne
Lincoln
Lompoc
Los Altos
Los Banos
Los Gatos
Manhattan
Beach
Martinez
Menlo Park
Monrovia
Montclair
Monterey
Morgan Hill
Newark
Oakley
Pacifica
Palm
Springs

Population
28,310
28,168
46,361
29,603
36,877
35,477
26,997
34,109
39,282
28,806
38,572
39,349
45,417
34,926
47,796
38,883
47,802
42,039
25,938
28,155
42,598
27,191
30,567
48,821
34,928
31,063
42,819
42,434
28,976
35,972
29,413
35,135
35,824
32,026
36,590
36,664
27,810
37,882
42,573
35,432
37,234
44,552

128

Property
Crime
620
1128
1136
546
781
601
471

Sworn Officer
Staffing
26
36
59
33
56
32
36

985
1471
702
1429
1451
1946
877
1643
1638
787
531

127
97
36
40
40
49
35
55
99
56
31

1,380

25

846
2408
1576
416
1555
889
643
447
932
233
1050
576

37
52
48
35
58
25
40
31
50
30
38
42

839
847
645
1080
1752
1183
642
1428
483
760

65
39
48
48
50
50
36
51
30
36

1973

88

Paradise
Paso Robles
Pleasant
Hill
Rohnert
Park
San Bruno
San Gabriel
San Luis
Obispo
San Pablo
Santa Paula
Seaside
Soledad
South
Pasadena
Suisun City
West
Sacramento

26,218
29,793
33,152
40,971
41,114
39,718
45,119
29,139
29,321
33,025
25,738
25,619
28,111
48,744

129

546
1006

24
32

1407

43

836
909
566

60
44
53

1686
1369
517
592
331

57
52
30
41
21

423
665

35
25

1345
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APPENDIX D
City
Atascadero
Atwater
Azusa
Banning
Beaumont
Bell
Benicia
Beverly Hills
Brea
Burlingame
Calexico
Campbell
Ceres
Claremont
Covina
Culver City
Cypress
Danville
Desert Hot
Springs
East Palo
Alto
El Centro
Eureka
Foster City
Gilroy
Hollister
La Verne
Lincoln
Lompoc
Los Altos
Los Banos
Los Gatos
Manhattan
Beach
Martinez
Menlo Park
Monrovia
Montclair
Monterey
Morgan Hill
Newark
Oakley
Pacifica
Palm Springs
Paradise
Paso Robles

Population
28,310
28,168
46,361
29,603
36,877
35,477
26,997
34,109
39,282
28,806
38,572
39,349
45,417
34,926
47,796
38,883
47,802
42,039
25,938
28,155
42,598
27,191
30,567
48,821
34,928
31,063
42,819
42,434
28,976
35,972
29,413
35,135
35,824
32,026
36,590
36,664
27,810
37,882
42,573
35,432
37,234
44,552
28,477
28,568
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Property
Sworn Officer
Crime
Staffing
658
26
1,400
30
1,204
60
708
27
1,342
51
662
27
390
34
1,081
111
1,292
85
707
36
1,538
38
1,649
44
1,940
52
901
37
1,651
56
1,760
101
1,018
55
442
30
1,157

29

587
2,477
1,956
345
1,788
724
823
506
1,166
299
1,210
629

33
50
50
35
58
22
40
19
48
30
36
39

855
930
625
948
1,703
1,016
695
1,349
477
578
2,232
479
777

59
34
47
46
50
46
35
51
28
33
87
21
27

Pleasant Hill
Rohnert Park
San Bruno
San Gabriel
San Luis
Obispo
San Pablo
Santa Paula
Seaside
Soledad
South
Pasadena
Suisun City
West
Sacramento

46,618
29,965
38,851
35,607
26,919
34,291
40,932
29,106
39,533
39,882
45,854
35,300

131

1,621
770
961
550

40
53
45
53

1,971
1,459
590
499
284

53
50
28
37
15

443
558

34
21

1,458
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